

POLICY *report*

Goldwater Institute

No. 242 | February 16, 2011

Keeping Americans Safe: Best Practices to Improve Community Policing and to Protect the Public

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

During the 1990s, New York City achieved stunning drops in crime from the “broken windows” community policing strategy adopted by Police Commissioner William Bratton. In two years, murder declined by 39 percent, robberies by about 33 percent and burglaries by 25 percent. New York’s approach completed the evolution of community policing from a reactive model into a proactive one, focusing on aggressive, effective crime-reduction that maintains order and holds police officers accountable. Aspects of this approach have been successfully adopted by a number of cities, including some in Arizona. Sustaining these gains requires embedding high-performance policing throughout a department to shield police agencies from the potentially corrupting influence of drug cartels - especially as the chaos in the border areas of Mexico threatens to spill over.

Expanding on recommendations in “A New Charter for American Cities,”¹ this report takes the broken windows approach to the next level by showing how to institute high-performance policing. This report consolidates the best practices adopted by the nation’s most innovative police departments and provides a framework for policing that is consistent with community values and priorities; makes a commitment to the ultimate objective of keeping people safe; and produces more measurable outcomes.

We recommend private sector concepts of *benchmarks* to track the use of best practices and to report quantifiable outcomes for comparison against other departments, and the *balanced scorecard*, which counts outcomes such as reducing crime and victimization and also assesses police relationships with community members, partners, and other groups. These recommendations should be institutionalized through appropriate statutes, ordinances or management directives governing policing agencies throughout America.

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Introduction

Ensuring public safety and order is one of the basic functions of government. Without safety and order, individual freedom is imperiled and the fundamental institutions of society – family, commerce, education, religion – cannot function adequately.

Arizona has enjoyed several years of law enforcement success, with reported violent crimes in all of its major cities sharply declining between 2008 and 2009.² But there is a new threat on the horizon. Running battles between suspected Mexican drug cartels and authorities have come within 75 miles of the Arizona border, with the police chief of Rocky Point recently gunned down.³ Aside from the possibility of such violence spilling over into Arizona's border communities,⁴ there is the increased risk that criminal gangs will create safe havens or bases of operations in communities throughout Arizona, increasing the risk of serious crime and the corruption of law enforcement.⁵ Against this backdrop, it is crucially important for Arizonans, inside and outside of the law enforcement community, to become conscious of the best practices of high-performance policing and to demand that they become standard practice for all law enforcement.

Ensuring public safety and order is one of the basic functions of government. Without safety and order, individual freedom is imperiled and the fundamental institutions of society - family, commerce, education, religion - cannot function adequately. In countries of Anglo-Saxon heritage such as our own, one of the primary means of achieving safety and order is through the actions of public police,

who patrol specific geographical areas in order to prevent crime and maintain order, respond after crimes occur, and investigate criminal events for the purpose of bringing offenders to justice. Even so, public police are by no means the sole providers of safety and order.

Fundamental to the Anglo-Saxon model of policing is the assumption that citizens are fully capable not only of governing, but also of policing themselves - a belief embodied in the principle articulated by Sir Robert Peel, prime minister of England, when the first modern police force was created in London in 1829: "The police at all times should maintain a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police; the police are only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interest of the community welfare."⁶ In American society today, taking action to ensure safety and order quite properly falls on many shoulders, involving private security companies, community and neighborhood groups, and vigilant and responsible individual citizens themselves.

Nevertheless, in the face of violent crime and disorder that undermine communities, as well as unexpected dangers and disasters, we recognize the need for local public police

forces; we accord police special powers beyond those that citizens are permitted to exercise routinely, give police particular responsibilities, and allocate public funds to pay for their services. Quite properly, we also demand accountability, lawful performance of police duties, and policing actions carried out fairly, efficiently, and effectively. The challenge for communities is to determine whether police are meeting our demands and their responsibilities.

This report presents recommendations for evaluating policing functions by which a community - its citizens, social and political leaders, and policymakers - can hold its police accountable for carrying out their duties in accordance with the legal and societal values of a free society, and commensurate with local goals; for performing effectively and efficiently; and for achieving established outcomes, both crime and non-crime related. This report thus provides a means by which a police organization, police performance itself, and policing outcomes can all be improved and compared against those of other police organizations. Implicit in the framework we offer is the assumption that a police department should be held accountable for demonstrating an understanding of local crime problems and concerns, knowledge of best practices in policing for addressing particular problems, and determination of their appropriate use in the local context. Police should also be accountable for carrying out creative, effective problem solving to reduce and prevent crime and maintain public order.

The discussion that follows is organized into four sections. The first section describes briefly how the business of policing developed in this country

over the past century, and examines related attempts to develop independent performance measures for police through the 1980s. In spite of their demonstrated inadequacy and problematic nature, many elements of policing from this period persist, and related performance measures are still utilized today. Any serious attempt to improve policing and measure policing activities and outcomes effectively must understand the limitations inherent in these earlier efforts; thus, we cannot escape a look back before looking ahead.

The second section chronicles the maturation of community policing beginning in the 1990s, characterized by the development of new tactics and strategies. These changes required a rethinking of performance measurement and accountability, including the adoption of measurement and management concepts from the private sector applicable to policing. This part of the discussion is important for setting out the current context within which a department's performance can be measured and improved.

The third section proposes a framework for assessing and measuring performance based around valued policing functions (determined for policing within a specific community), ultimate objectives, outputs (activities and best practices carried out to achieve the goals), and outcomes (the ultimate effects of policing outputs). Both outputs and outcomes are discussed critically and in detail. The framework also incorporates two concepts borrowed from the private sector - a balanced scorecard approach and benchmarks.

The report concludes with recommendations to institutionalize high-

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performance policing in Arizona by way of statute, ordinance, or management directive.⁷

The History of Policing and Performance Measurement

The history of policing in the United States can be divided into three eras, each governed by a particular organizational strategy: political (1840s-1920s), reform/progressive (1920s-1970s), and community (1980s-through today).⁸

Political Policing

When police were introduced in the United States during the mid-19th century, they were overlaid on the existing structures of local government. Unlike in England, where for over a century the national political and social elite debated how cities like London should be policed, the U.S. debates were local, in the smoke-filled rooms of city halls where police were first established. With few exceptions, national and state police in this country entered later, as early 20th-century developments. As historian Robert M. Fogelson pointed out, “From the outset most Americans had a firm belief that the police should be controlled by local officials and organized along municipal lines.”⁹ Just as cities were divided into wards controlled by local politicians, police departments were organized along district or precinct lines corresponding to those wards. Fogelson described these early American police departments as “adjuncts” to the political machines that dominated most cities during the late 19th and into the 20th centuries: ward leaders (bosses) selected district captains as well as most

local police officers. It was not surprising then that in Irish communities most of the police were Irish, in Jewish communities they were predominately Jews, in Italian neighborhoods Italians, and so forth.

In terms of function, police departments were catchall organizations that provided the services politicians and their constituents demanded, from housing the homeless to cleaning streets. Ward leaders handpicked police and local ward commanders and decided police priorities, which laws police were to enforce, and how order should be defined. Police accountability was specific and strict: they were to please citizens, ensuring that ward leaders remained in office; failure for police likely meant loss of their patronage jobs. Certainly police were expected to respond to crimes and maintain order, but the ultimate test of their efficacy was to assist ward bosses in maintaining their positions.

Reform/Progressive Policing

Reformers, mostly outside of policing and especially clergy, railed against the police during the latter decades of the 19th century, but it was not until police allied with progressives early in the next century that the powerful ties between police and political machines were broken. More than any other police official, Berkeley-California Chief of Police (1907-1932) August Vollmer represented the effort to remove police from the control of ward politicians.¹⁰ For Vollmer, political influence and control were at the core of all that was wrong with American policing - corruption, inefficiency, and ineffectiveness. One way to free police from accountability to local politicians was to develop “scientific” measures of performance, the use of which

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would allow police to appeal directly to the public for support. The Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program, which Vollmer was instrumental in developing for the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) in 1929, and newly created annual reports published by police departments that highlighted these crime statistics, were viewed as early means by which police would achieve this independence. Other measures included instituting tenure for chiefs of police, civil service for employees, and the use of tactics that put police out of reach of potentially corrupting citizens.

The UCR included seven crimes: murder and non-negligent homicide, forcible rape, burglary, aggravated assault, larceny, and motor vehicle theft; arson was added in 1979. The U.S. Department of Justice, with IACP support, took over compiling and reporting the UCR in 1930, assigning the task to the Bureau of Investigation (later the Federal Bureau of Investigation, under J. Edgar Hoover). The purpose of the UCR program was to provide a baseline against which police departments could measure crime trends over time, and a basis for comparison among cities. As a measure of police performance, however, the UCR reports had, and have, shortcomings: first, they use self-reported data that are vulnerable to manipulation throughout police organizations; second, citizens never report a large proportion of crimes; third, the reports only record serious crime - misdemeanors are ignored; and finally, what UCR data tell us is not always clear. Take rape as an example. If departments improve their handling of rape victims and this becomes well known, victims who previously would not have reported a rape might now be more inclined to do so. Thus, UCR data

could reflect increases in reported rape even though actual rapes might decline. Nonetheless, to this day the UCR program remains an important metric in evaluating police departments and units.

Congruent with the development of the UCR program, the police function shifted from providing a broad array of services for citizens to identifying and apprehending criminals: police became law enforcement officers whose “business” was to arrest criminals during a criminal act or after a criminal investigation. According to this model, incarceration, or criminals’ fear of getting caught, would produce crime control. Arrests, citations, and clearances became the second set of major metrics used to evaluate departments, units, and individual officers. Like the UCR, these measures also had problems. Chief among them was that the legal definition of arrest can vary widely among states and agencies, while definitions of case clearance can vary widely by organization. Moreover, strong emphasis on obtaining arrests and citations can lead to data manipulation and encourage over-criminalization of target groups or specific crime problems.

Nevertheless, architects of these changes saw policing as a relatively simple set of tasks given to straightforward and predictable actions by officers. After a crime was committed, police would go to the scene. If an offender was present, they would arrest him or her. If an offender was not present, the attending officer would collect whatever evidence or information was available and turn it over to a detective for investigation. The detective would clear the case and, if it was strong enough, turn it over to a prosecutor. For O.W. Wilson, a police protégé of Vollmer who

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was considered *the* last word on policing from the late 1930s to the 1960s, day-to-day police work was akin to that of a typist working from a manuscript: reflexive, simple, and routine.¹¹ This characterization of policing as analogous to rote typing suggests that policing is performed and organized as a *production line* or *flow shop* - that is, a common sequence of activities, carried out with little discretion or flexibility by staff of limited skill.¹²

By the mid-20th century, police departments and their overseers had developed five basic metrics of police performance: UCR, arrest, citations, clearances, and response time. All “fit” the strategy in place during this era. To this day, these metrics remain important indicators of police performance and will continue to be important in the future. Nevertheless, they do not take into account the complexity of problems police face, nor do they measure the diversity of their responses.

During the middle decades of the 20th century, the business of policing was presumed to be serious crime. Policing’s tools were arrests, citations, and clearances, and it was evaluated according to levels of serious crime and the number of arrests, citations, and clearances. As cars became more ubiquitous, police used them first to go from beat to beat to patrol by foot and later to patrol in cars to create a sense of police omnipresence that supposedly would reassure citizens and deter criminals. With car radios and home telephones more common, rapidly responding to calls for service became the keystone of police service. By the 1960s, “full service” policing meant responding to all calls for service in three minutes. Such response times, and the number of times patrol cars passed neighborhood “hazards” including saloons, schools, etc., were added to the UCR and processing metrics, such as arrest, as benchmarks by which departments were evaluated.

Thus, by the mid-20th century, police departments and their overseers had developed five basic metrics of police performance: UCR, arrest, citations, clearances, and response time. All “fit” the strategy in place during this era. They reflected the focus on felonies and the

deterrence tactics of preventive patrol by automobile, rapid response to calls for service, and criminal investigation. To this day, these metrics remain important indicators of police performance and will continue to be important in the future. Nevertheless, they do not take into account the complexity of problems police face, nor do they measure the diversity of their responses.

In February 1965, President Lyndon Johnson’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice published its report, *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society*, an influential document that gave formal recognition and validation to the form and substance of policing described previously and helped perpetuate it for decades. Three elements of the report are of special interest here. First, the report put forward a theory of crime causation and prevention that would dominate criminology, criminal justice, and policing for at least 30 years, and much academic thinking about crime and criminal justice to this day. At its core was the idea that crime is caused by poverty, racism, and social injustice and can only be prevented by ameliorating these problems. Second, the report led to startup funding for academic criminal justice programs, schools, and colleges throughout the country that to a great extent carried on Commission thinking. Third and most relevant here, the report largely endorsed the law enforcement view of police described previously: while police could improve in a variety of ways, especially with the recruitment of minorities, the challenge was essentially to do better that which was already being done. The Commission’s view of crime causation and prevention was largely congruent with the progressive law

enforcement strategy of police - that crime is prevented through social engineering, and police respond when prevention fails.

Early Community Policing

Despite the essential endorsement of its strategy by the President's Commission, policing as it was then carried out in the United States was already beginning to collapse during the 1960s and 1970s. The riots of the 1960s revealed pervasive resentment by the black community of policing, and lack of preparedness on the part of police to deal with broad-based dissent. Crime began an unrelenting surge starting in the 1960s that continued through the 1980s, threatening or destroying the quality of life in city after city. Research into police tactics suggested that preventive patrol and rapid response to calls for service had little beneficial impact on urban life and little effect on citizen safety, fear of crime, or crime itself. Research into police functioning demonstrated that although police identified themselves as law enforcement officers, they actually did little law enforcement, that police at all levels had enormous discretion and used it regularly, and that police routinely provided a wide array of public services although most were unrecognized and unacknowledged.¹³ In short, by the end of the 1970s, American policing was a capacity struggling to find its identity - nothing seemed to "work." The idea of a *production line* didn't fit how police actually performed, and police were at odds with substantial portions of the public.

Still under the influence of the President's Commission, police nonetheless began reconsidering their strategy during the 1980s; their efforts became identified

with the move to community policing. Community policing acknowledged the complexity of policing; urged police to reach out to various communities and institutions to gain, at minimum, their consent to be policed; recognized that even within the same city different neighborhoods have different problems; and adopted a new mission of policing far broader than its previous role as the front end of a criminal justice system focused on arresting and processing offenders. Community policing thus emphasized neighborhood problems - analyzing crime incidents not as isolated events but as symptoms of underlying causes - collaborating with public and private sector institutions and organizations to identify and solve such problems, and decentralized decision-making regarding priorities and solutions.

The problem with early community policing as practiced during the 1980s was twofold. First, the idea that crime could only be prevented through massive social change continued to dominate popular and professional thinking about policing. Lee P. Brown, the community policing advocate who ultimately served as New York City Police Commissioner, was quite clear: "We must look at the underlying factors that produce crime.... If we don't address the causes of crime, I fully expect that 20 years from now we will still have a major problem."¹⁴ Second, community policing failed to capture the vision of line police officers. For them, community policing was "soft" or "feel good" policing, more akin to social work than the law enforcement they thought they were getting into. But all this changed in the 1990s as community policing grew into a full-fledged new strategy.

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The Maturation of Community Policing

The strategy that dominates American policing today, which is the foundation of the recommendations made in this report, had its origins in the 1980s and early 1990s. During the 1990s, the political and policing landscape in the United States changed considerably. In cities like New York, “tolerating the intolerable,” to use Norman Podhoretz’s phrase describing urban disorder and crime, was no longer acceptable.¹⁵ A demand for order expressed itself politically, resulting in the election of mayors like Rudy Giuliani - a conservative in an overwhelmingly liberal city. Police were rejuvenated as departments unveiled a new strategy that produced crime declines unmatched in then-recent history. Overthrowing the previously accepted view that crime could only be prevented through massive social, economic, and political change, police now could claim to be more than law enforcement officers whose responsibility was responding to crime after it occurred. By the end of the century, the contours of a community policing strategy that would replace the progressive/reform strategy became clear.

A revolution in thinking about performance measurement accompanied these changes and played a role in the ongoing development of the strategy itself. Partially driven by the article “Measuring What Matters,”¹⁶ the National Institute of Justice convened a series of meetings with police and academics to focus on performance measurement. The Bureau of Justice Statistics also sponsored a special program at Princeton University that produced the carefully thought-out

publication, *Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System*, in 1993.¹⁷

At the forefront of the transformation in policing was a new generation of police leadership, most well educated under the Law Enforcement Education Program (LEEP), which recognized the failure of the law enforcement strategy and the promise of ideas such as “problem solving” and broken windows. The broken windows policing approach contends that neighborhood disorderly behavior and conditions are linked to fear of crime, citizen abandonment of public spaces, serious crime, and urban decay - hence, police should take disorderly conditions and behavior seriously and deal with them.¹⁸ The complementary problem solving approach arose under the influence of University of Wisconsin Professor Emeritus Herman Goldstein, when police came to understand that their mid-20th century focus on *incidents* (i.e., get a call, respond and handle the call as quickly as possible, and then get on to the next call) as their primary unit of work was a mistake.¹⁹ Many, if not most, incidents were symptoms of underlying *problems* that could often be managed by citizens themselves or other agencies.

As an example, it is now well established that a high proportion of calls for service come from a relatively small percentage of residential or business addresses. Of the many taverns in a city, only a few are the subject of repeat calls for service for troubles either in or immediately outside their premises. Rather than just go to call after call, problem-solving police departments would establish the chronic nature of the problem and involve other agencies that can most effectively deal with it - in this

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example, perhaps engaging liquor-licensing authorities to deal with problem taverns.

Problem solving tactics thus involve both increased reliance on other agencies to meet their responsibilities in addressing the underlying cause of a criminal incident and the police “SARA” methodology. When applying the SARA methodology, first police “Scan” the neighborhood to determine what is a problem, whether it is increasing or decreasing, where it is most acute, and which groups or types of people suffer the most from it; second, police “Analyze” to determine more specifically the causes of identified problems within the neighborhood, recognizing that these causes might differ between neighborhoods, change in time, and vary among categories of residents; third, police “Respond” in a way that is tailored and targeted to the neighborhood’s specific problems and their causes; and fourth, police “Assess” the response to determine whether it is working to solve the problem and, if not, the reasons for failure.²⁰

In view of such tactics, it is clear that characterizing community policing as soft fails to recognize the inherent aggressiveness of police problem-solving and crime-prevention activities, as well as the potential impact on felony crime.²¹ For good or ill, the progressive/reform model of policing was relatively nonintrusive in urban life; basically police sat back, waited for something to happen, and then responded. Mature community policing, on the other hand, seeks to prevent crime rather than merely responding after the fact. It does so by attempting to anticipate security breakdowns and crime opportunities and interfere with their progression; officers are in constant touch with citizens in local

neighborhoods; police work closely with partners in other justice agencies and in the private sector, all bringing information, knowledge, and resources to bear on problems in particular areas.

By embracing problem solving and broken windows as community policing tactics, the new generation of police leadership in the 1990s moved beyond reactive law enforcement policing alone to developing a capacity that included new tactics to prevent and reduce crime. In early 1990, for example, William Bratton began working in New York City, where he would carry out radical changes in urban policing. After an earlier attempt failed to restore order in the city’s subway system, the New York City Transit Authority hired Bratton to head the Transit Authority Police Department, then an independent police agency of approximately 3,600 officers. Order was restored and crime began to decline in the subway almost immediately after Bratton took charge.²² Then, in 1994, as Mayor Giuliani’s first police commissioner, Bratton assumed command of the New York Police Department (NYPD) and immediately demanded that precinct captains produce “double-digit” declines in crime. Within two years, murder declined by 39 percent, auto theft by 35 percent, robberies by approximately 33 percent, and burglaries by 25 percent.²³

New York City’s experience broke the mold: it suggested to prudent politicians and policymakers alike that police departments were shortchanging many U.S. cities, that police actually possessed untapped potential to provide more value to cities than they had during past decades. Under Bratton, strategic changes in policing ranged from organizational overhauls to

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tactical innovations. Although he pushed non-crime goals as well, it was clear that crime prevention, stopping the next crime rather than responding after the fact, was at the core of community policing in New York. Reduced crime was the bottom line. To facilitate and monitor this goal, Bratton established CompStat, a crime analysis and accountability management system that traced the progress of individual precincts in achieving substantial crime reduction; required mid-management to understand the nature of problems in specific geographical areas as well as craft creative responses to these problems; and set consequences for mid-management's achievements or failures.²⁴ Central to the effectiveness of the CompStat system - both then and now - is its requirement that police captains meet regularly with their superiors and peers to present and discuss their crime problems and plans for managing them.

Under William Bratton, strategic changes in policing ranged from organizational overhauls to tactical innovations. Crime prevention, stopping the next crime rather than responding after the fact, was at the core of community policing in New York.

Bratton's actions represented new concepts in American policing, and the NYPD's success produced enormous controversy: to what extent was the NYPD responsible for NYC's remarkable crime drops? Were the crime data manipulated? Was CompStat too rough on district captains? How replicable was the NYPD experience, including CompStat? These controversies still rage, and research on them continues. Nonetheless, New York City's experience has been replicated throughout the United States. Similar efforts produced equally dramatic results in Boston, where police collaborated with other justice agency partners in Operation Cease Fire and dramatically reduced youth gang violence in the mid-1990s,²⁵ and in San Diego, which took the national lead in developing a problem-solving

methodology. Ultimately, many other locations experienced similar declines, including tough cities like Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Newark.²⁶

Is Arizona An Exception To The Rule?

At this point, it is important to consider the extent to which the principles, recommendations, and wide-ranging examples discussed in this report are applicable to Arizona, especially its urban centers, and pertinent to its needs. Conventional wisdom emphasizes Arizona's uniqueness as a state with a comparatively low population density and large retirement population, as a border state with serious illegal immigration problems, and as a state with a unique political culture. It is fair to ask whether what has happened in New York City, Boston, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, and other American cities is relevant to Arizona.

Such questions are certainly not exclusive to Arizona: New Yorkers believe that their city is so unique that it cannot be compared with any other. They are partially right - no city in the United States has an area comparable to sections of Manhattan. At the same time, whole sections of Queens could be relocated to Milwaukee or Kansas City and hardly be recognized as distinct. Likewise, Arizona cities such as Phoenix, Tucson, and Tempe possess distinguishing characteristics, yet all three have residential and small-business commercial areas that would fit indistinguishably into Los Angeles or San Diego. This is not to deny the existence of regional cultures in this country that are highly distinctive. Arizona is clearly at the

heart of a Southwestern culture that has developed as a consequence of its history, climate and topography, proximity to Mexico, Native American population, the federalization of a good portion of the state, and many other factors. Furthermore, even within the same state, cultures may vary widely: for example, Los Angeles and San Francisco have very different cultures, as do Phoenix and Tucson.

If we look closely, however, despite regional cultures and other differences characterizing cities and states, U.S. cities may be more alike than generally assumed. Arizona is noted as having low population density, and in one respect this is true: it ranks 33rd among all states, with 55.8 residents per square mile (the national average is 86.2 residents per square mile, with New Jersey having the highest at 1,171.1²⁷). Yet, at 88 percent, Arizona ranks 13th in the proportion of its population living in metropolitan statistical areas. Arizona is more urbanized than Michigan

or Ohio and barely lags New York and Texas (see Figure 1).²⁸

Additionally, as a retirement location, Arizona is commonly thought to have a relatively aged population. Yet Arizona's age distribution shows a slightly smaller proportion of residents 65 or older (11 percent) than the national average (13 percent).²⁹ Moreover, Arizona's 65-or-older proportion is at parity with Illinois and California, slightly higher than Texas's (10 percent), and *lower* than that of New York (13 percent). This is likely explained by the percentage of Hispanic residents in Arizona, double that of the U.S. population as a whole (nationally, 16 percent; Arizona, 31 percent), reflecting recent immigration by young families with children or higher birth rates among these families. This is hardly a demographic fact unique to Arizona and further underscores the similarity between Arizona and many other jurisdictions where mature community policing has been successfully implemented.

Figure 1: Arizona Has a Highly Urbanized Population





Figure 2: Arizona’s Retirement Community Is Not Unusual



Some Arizona cities have already devised methodologies congruent with national developments. Mesa has developed a sophisticated crime reporting system in support of its CompStat program. Tempe has been viewed as an exemplar of mature community policing.

U.S. cities do have distinguishing characteristics - as well as a great many commonalities. And while we would tend to compare Arizona cities such as Phoenix with other Southwestern sprawling cities such as Dallas and Los Angeles, this does not mean that police functions, outputs, and outcomes would necessarily vary any less than if we compared them with Boston, Milwaukee, or Kansas City. Gangs, a serious problem in Phoenix, also plague Los Angeles, Chicago, and Boston; some of the methods used and experiences gained in these latter cities are directly relevant to cities like Phoenix and Tempe.³⁰ Indeed, some Arizona cities have already devised methodologies congruent with national developments. Mesa has developed a sophisticated crime reporting system in support of its CompStat program.³¹ And as one of its early adopters,³² Tempe has been viewed, especially in recent years, as an exemplar of mature community policing.³³

Distinctive features of Arizona cities might require unique policing approaches and methods or perhaps a different mix of tactics. The gated neighborhoods of Phoenix make a move toward more privatization of policing services there supportable; the sprawling nature of cities means that less reliance on foot patrol is reasonable; the closeness of the Mexican border means that more emphasis is warranted on crimes and tactics associated with violent drug gangs (e.g., kidnapping); and so on. All of this, however, is congruent with the principles we will discuss: policing is complex; problems vary by city and neighborhood; police should analyze problems in light of this complexity and variability; methods should be tailored to specific local problems identified. Where proven best practices from other locations, which are consolidated below, appear to fit Arizona needs, they should be considered and implemented with appropriate local adaptations.

A Framework for Measuring and Improving Police Performance

As already discussed, community policing is an organizational strategy of police departments akin to corporate strategies in the private sector that seeks to preserve and approximate the ancient Anglo-Saxon tradition of citizens policing themselves, by working closely with neighborhoods and communities to define problems and craft solutions. In the 1980s, while policing was still under the influence of the “root-causes” theory of crime control, the initial orientation of community policing concentrated on reducing citizen fear of crime, maintaining close relationships with citizens in neighborhoods, and enforcing the law (reacting after a crime occurred).

During the mid-1990s, however, community policing matured and moved beyond root-causes theories and sharpened its crime prevention focus. It is now understood that community policing’s proper and primary focus is preventing crime by aggressive proactive tactics including maintaining order, concentrating on “hot spots” of crime and repeat violent offenders, and collaborating with citizens and private and public agencies to solve problems.

With this understanding of the current dominant strategy of American policing and how it developed and should apply, we turn now to examining how policing processes and outcomes should be assessed and improved. During the late 1990s, in response to the “measuring what matters” concerns that grew out of community policing, broken windows, and New York and other cities’ experiences, the issues of measuring police outputs and outcomes

went through substantial rethinking. New questions arose: How do we measure crime prevention? Fear reduction? The quality of a police problem-solving capacity? Effective collaboration by police with citizens or other justice agency partners?

From the private sector, we draw upon the concept of a balanced scorecard to develop the framework recommended in this report. As Kaplan and Norton describe the balanced scorecard for financial institutions, benchmarks for traditional financial measures should be accompanied by measures of relationships with customers, internal processes, and ongoing learning that improves processes and outcomes.³⁴ Applying the notion of a balanced scorecard to public policing leads to a broadening of how the bottom line - those desired results that police achieve to justify both public funding and the authority they are granted - would be treated.³⁵ It translates into a focus not only upon measuring whether outcomes are achieved (e.g., reducing crime and victimization) but also on assessing police activities, tactics, and programs. It also requires monitoring relationships with community members, partners, and other interests and groups (referring to citizens - not merely victims or offenders, more aptly described as “customers”) who have formal or informal authority over police, or at least seek to influence them. Accordingly, the framework we propose here for assessing and improving police performance focuses upon four arenas: first, ensuring policing that is consistent with community values and priorities; second, making a commitment to the ultimate objectives of policing; third, promoting excellence in policing performance; and fourth, producing improvement in measurable policing outcomes.³⁶

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Policing Consistent with Community Values and Priorities

The starting point of our framework is identifying what a society or community expects of its police and determining how to ensure police accountability to citizens in the community, thereby maintaining the legitimacy police need to perform their work. Part of the genius of Anglo-Saxon policing is that it is based on the principle of people policing themselves - in modern society, this is done through professional surrogates. Modern community policing's emphasis on policing consistent with community and neighborhood values reflects this principle; however, for a good share of the 20th century, police largely ignored these values, asserting that "police knew best." As police became distant "professionals," the consent and support they needed from local citizens dissipated, while communities became less safe and more alienated from police.

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No one is better informed about local crime problems than citizens in neighborhoods who experience them every day. Therefore, effective policing in a community requires that police regularly monitor and attend to their relationships with a range of citizens and interest groups.³⁷ Such analyses and monitoring go beyond conforming to the requirements of formal political demands and input from elected officials. In practice, police should be collaborating with public and private groups and agencies to address crime problems in particular locations. The form that these relationships and collaborations take will depend upon population demographics, commercial and residential patterns, types and amount of crime and other problems, and the

capacities and vulnerabilities of particular local communities. Police must acquire a thorough knowledge of individual neighborhoods and areas in the community so as to ensure a match between the content of and manner in which policing services are delivered, even in matters such as recruitment and hiring, and community characteristics and needs. This includes achieving an understanding of community preferences and expectations and obtaining direct citizen input, which police can do through conducting surveys (an important source of such information in Tempe) and/or focus groups; regularly attending and participating in neighborhood and community meetings; producing annual police district and precinct reports; establishing regular feedback channels with partners in other justice agencies, and private and public institutions; and developing a citizens police academy. Police responses to community interests and involvement in working with them to address quality of life and crime problems should be, insofar as possible, encouraging, positive, and receptive. The era of Joe Friday's "just the facts, ma'am" is in the past.

Policing clearly requires sensitivity and responsiveness to legitimate community and neighborhood issues. To be effective in its ultimate objectives, policing functions should be crime related but also allow for the kind of noncriminal police work that is necessary to maintain law and order.³⁸ From the 1920s on, police have tried to strip themselves of non-crime functions; yet they could not, for a number of reasons. The links among disorder, fear, and serious crime have become clearly apparent, so police cannot ignore order maintenance where citizens are unable to maintain order

themselves. Even minor conflicts have the potential for spinning off into violence. In other words, excellent policing is anything but simplistic; citizens have wide-ranging legitimate expectations of what police could and should do; and police themselves now understand that since their business is complex and broad, they have to manage it in those terms (see Figure 3).³⁹

Engaging the community does not mean, however, that police should cater to every community whim. Rather, police must learn to “manage” demand.⁴⁰ When communities, particular neighborhoods, or local groups espouse values and priorities that are trivial or even alien to constitutional, legal, and moral principles - as they surely do at times - police must be able to say “no” to requests for police action that departs from those principles,


or lies clearly outside appropriate policing functions. Therefore, negotiating a consensus about priorities and desired policing outcomes with local interests and groups requires the development of police practices and policies within the context of a strong police vision of *functions* and ultimate objectives that are appropriate and consistent with constitutional and legal principles.

Making a Commitment to the Ultimate Objectives of Policing

According to Mark Moore of Harvard University and his colleagues, there are essentially seven “dimensions of police performance,”⁴¹ which identify the ultimate objectives of policing: (1) reducing crime and victimization; (2) effectively initiating justice processes;⁴² (3) reducing fear and

Excellent policing is anything but simplistic; citizens have wide-ranging, legitimate expectations of what police could and should do, and police themselves now understand that since their business is complex and broad, they have to manage it in those terms.

Figure 3: Police Must Engage the Community to Earn Legitimacy



enhancing personal security; (4) ensuring safety in public spaces; (5) using financial resources fairly, efficiently, and effectively; (6) using force and authority fairly, efficiently, and effectively; and (7) satisfying consumer demands/achieving legitimacy with those policed. These objectives do not imply that every police department will look or perform the same, nor that the outcomes all communities demand and expect from their police departments will be identical. The needs and expectations of different cities, neighborhoods, and communities will not be monolithic. Even such basic features as minimum acceptable levels of security and maximum tolerable levels of violence will vary: within one city or county, demands may vary considerably between neighborhoods from reducing street prostitution, to street-corner drug dealing, to illegal parking, to gang activity and homicides. Therefore, police, in consultation with leadership and citizens within a particular city, district, or precinct, are responsible for targeting and prioritizing specific problems and solutions within these seven ultimate policing objectives based on local circumstances.

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Subject to this caveat, we describe each of the seven ultimate objectives of policing:

1. *Reducing Crime and Victimization:* This objective is the first and most important element of the police mission. Police should begin by focusing on crime prevention rather than law enforcement alone.
2. *Effectively Initiating Justice Processes:* Police properly pursue justice by investigating crime and arresting offenders. While many citizens see

this objective as an end in itself, the practical effects may also be related to crime reduction through deterrence and incapacitation of offenders.

3. *Reducing Fear and Enhancing Personal Security:* Police should recognize that fear of crime, even apart from crime itself, has enormous consequences for neighborhoods and communities. People act on fear by withdrawing from public spaces, locking themselves in their homes, or even moving from neighborhoods. All of these actions undermine their own quality of life and the vitality of the community and its capacities, threatening schools, industry, commerce, churches, and other institutions.
4. *Ensuring Safety in Public Spaces:* This objective overlaps with the point immediately above but includes safety associated with traffic, medical and other emergencies, public and political demonstrations, and other such problems and events. The safety of public spaces has long been fundamental to our social, political, and economic activities.
5. *Using Financial Resources Fairly, Efficiently, and Effectively:* To carry out their mission, police are entrusted with a substantial proportion of a city's economic resources. The minimum amount of public funds required should be used to produce the outcomes sought.
6. *Using Force and Authority Fairly, Efficiently, and Effectively:* By its very nature, policing implies having the

capacity to use authority and force to obtain compliance. This force ranges from ordering someone to desist from some behavior to using deadly force. It is an expendable resource that police can squander if not managed effectively: it matters a great deal that citizens perceive police fairness in using force, that police use the least amount of force required, and that they use it in accordance with the law.

7. *Satisfying Customer Demands/Achieving Legitimacy with Those Policed*: Like use of force and financial resources, trust and legitimacy are resources essential both to perform police services and to maintain public support for police. Important here are not only law enforcement activities during which victims and even offenders should be treated properly, but public services and contacts that police have with ordinary citizens – all of which lead to perceptions of satisfaction and police legitimacy.

This list covers the essential functions that police should be expected to perform with respect to ensuring safety, security, and civility in a community (objectives one through four), as well as basic criteria that should ultimately characterize their actions in performing these functions (objectives five through seven).⁴³ These objectives should be regarded as outlining the categories of a balanced scorecard - a mix of crime and non-crime measures, which includes measures of crime reduction and community satisfaction, akin to the financial and nonfinancial measures used in the private sector - to evaluate individual, unit, and organizational police performance.⁴⁴

Promoting Excellence in Police Performance

We turn now to the third arena for improving police performance, those technologies, activities, and tactics (“outputs”) that have received some degree of recognition as best practices for achieving each of the foregoing seven ultimate objectives of policing. Appropriate benchmarks corresponding to each output should be considered. Benchmarking is defined by the *Dictionary of Business* as “The process of identifying the best practice in relation to products and processes, both within an industry and outside it, with the object of using this as a guide and reference point for improving the practice of one’s own organization.”⁴⁵ At first glance, policing appears to be a natural for external benchmarking. For example, comparing one department with another on specific outcomes, say car theft, would appear to be appropriate. Because of the demands made by private insurers, UCR car-theft data are relatively reliable. Given that a “portfolio” of police anti-car theft tactics can be identified, it would also appear appropriate to compare departments’ outputs in terms of the numbers of arrests, crime clearances, and so on. Internal benchmarking, including those between districts and within a department, would seem appropriate for the same reason.

The problem, and where the analogy between private and public sector organizations can break down, is that all car theft is not the same. Depending on the city or area within a city, different forms of car thefts cluster. If a car is stolen from a downtown Boston entertainment area, it will most likely be found in a suburban area; teens steal cars to get from the city back to their own neighborhoods. If a car is stolen

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from another specific area, it is more likely to be found in another port city, such as Providence, RI, being prepared for shipment overseas. A car stolen from yet another area is likely to end up in a local “chop shop,” dismantled for the sale of parts. UCR measurements do not distinguish among these different forms of car theft or suggest much about the police tactics required to deal with them. Yet it is crucial to recognize that “[b]enchmarking is not informative when it is used to compare fundamentally different processes or products.”⁴⁶

Police are still in the early stages of developing many best practices and benchmarks. Throughout the 1970s, police and researchers learned more about what didn't work than what did. Regarding a core function, crime prevention, only in the mid-1990s did policing begin to create a portfolio of tactics and activities that offered promise of predictable results.

Police are still in the early stages of developing many best practices and benchmarks. Throughout the 1970s, police and researchers learned more about what didn't work than what did. Regarding a core function, crime prevention, only in the mid-1990s did policing begin to create a portfolio of tactics and activities that offered promise of predictable results. Even then, some of what was considered the best research provided results that could not be replicated. The most egregious example was the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment of the early 1980s, which found that arresting an assailant produced outcomes superior to those obtained from offering advice and counsel or asking the assailant to leave for eight hours.⁴⁷ The experiment had an enormous impact on public policy, yet three subsequent replications of the study failed to support its findings. Consequently, in our attempt to identify best practices and corresponding benchmarks in the following pages, we counsel readers to be cautious. Some of these practices are solidly supported by experimental research; others by correlational studies; others still by reflected-upon experience.⁴⁸ Police departments are clearly responsible for identifying the value

and applicability of specific practices and their use as benchmarks based on their own unique circumstances.

Additionally, it should not be forgotten that in policing, process can, does, and often *should* “trump” outcome. Put another way, good police work is work conducted properly. This emphasis is especially significant, since American police operate within a constitutional and legal framework that appropriately constrains their exercise of power and authority. If we examine the value of calling offenders to account as an example, *how* an arrest is made or an investigation conducted is ultimately more important than obtaining a specific outcome. Measuring outputs, therefore, presents particular problems in policing, and we discuss the issue only briefly here.

Some measurements, such as the UCR program, are readily available but can be manipulated and hard to interpret. Others, such as victimization surveys, provide a relatively reliable picture of what they measure but are expensive and require administration skills not typically found in police departments. And almost without exception we can define or describe outputs, and usually measure their impact, with relative certainty but can say little quantitatively about their dimension or scope. An example of this is foot patrol in mixed-use neighborhoods that include both residential and small businesses. We know from research in Newark, New Jersey, that fear is substantially reduced when officers patrol during one shift per week. We also know that fear of crime increases when foot patrol stops.⁴⁹ Yet we have no idea of what benefits, if any, would result if foot patrol were to be increased beyond tested levels, nor do we know how far we could

reduce the “dosage” of foot patrol before seeing a loss in impact.

Further complicating the issue is the variation in problems police address across and within cities, and in the priorities of citizens. Different cities not only have different problems but different tolerance levels for certain kinds of behavior. Comparing Milwaukee and San Francisco with regard to levels of disorder as a possible outcome measure for reducing fear and/or guaranteeing safety is simply not feasible. Milwaukee has traditions of orderliness quite alien to San Francisco’s traditions of freedom of expression. Likewise, comparing districts within a city is problematic.

By identifying a selection of widely recognized tactics and benchmarks in policing that for legitimate reasons seem to offer promise for obtaining a desired goal, we hope to reinforce the conclusion that the police response of “sending a car,” “increasing the level of patrol,” or “assigning a special unit” to solve a problem is no longer acceptable police practice. Any prudent and knowledgeable police manager, when confronted by some problem - that is, a recurrent pattern of incidents in either time or space - must seek solutions from the inventory of tactics that have developed locally as well as in other departments, and from police literature.⁵⁰ Moreover, within the context of their defined functions, police should negotiate and renegotiate a consensus about desired performance benchmarks based on the Constitution, laws and ordinances, and the amount of injury and damage problems are causing a neighborhood or community. Regardless of the bargain struck between police and citizens, frequent monitoring and evaluation should permit adjustment

of a community’s performance benchmarks in light of achievements or failure to produce policing outcomes, as well as changing local circumstances.

In sum, ongoing documentation of outputs by police departments and making them available to public scrutiny is crucially important to ensuring high performance, whether the activity is routine and familiar, or a new “best practice” being adopted and implemented for the first time. Particular problem-solving projects require a formal evaluation to determine whether they should continue, and what adjustments are appropriate along the way. But more than this, police need to regularly debrief their operations. Most departments are extremely reluctant to debrief operations, especially when they go bad, preferring instead either to deny problems or play the “blame game.” Learning from mistakes and making them public so that others can learn from them as well is as important as learning from successes. Examined experiences and related data collection might not have the explanatory power of controlled experiments, but they are the beginning of developing practical knowledge and skill and to determining whether performance benchmarks are being met.

A Select Inventory of Best Practices and Benchmarks

We turn now to identifying and discussing the activities and best practices (outputs) that we believe any reasonable police department must consider implementing, and contemplate using as benchmarks when determining how to achieve each of the seven ultimate objectives of policing discussed above (see Figure 4).

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Figure 4: A Balanced Scorecard of Best Practices*

Objectives								
Reduce Crime and Victimization	Establish the presence of police through patrols and participation in community activities	✓	Maintain order through the broken windows approach	✓	Deter crime with “pulling levers,” hot spot approaches, and law enforcement	✓	Solve problems with a focus on identifying clusters of related activities rather than individual incidents	✓
Effectively Initiate Justice Processes	Measure and benchmark the number and quality of arrests	✓	Measure and benchmark quality clearances	✓	Measure and benchmark the percentage of cases resolved either by plea bargaining or conviction	✓	For detectives, identify crime patterns and share information with patrol officers, special unit officers, and community interests and groups	✓
Reduce Fear and Enhance Personal Security	Increase the perceived presence of police by citizens through foot and bicycle patrol, and increased police-citizen interaction	✓	Maintain order through the broken windows approach	✓	Target resources to specific neighborhood problems	✓	Organize the self-defense capacity of neighborhoods and communities	✓
Ensure Safety in Public Spaces	Implement vehicular, foot, and bike patrols in parks and other public places	✓	Partner with private security and businesses	✓	Study public spaces and craft specific programs to solve disorder problems	✓	Enforce traffic laws; establish citizen ownership of public spaces (e.g., parks)	✓
Use Financial Resources Fairly, Efficiently, and Effectively	Maintain budget controls and set goals for the cost each citizen pays for police protection	✓	Establish benchmarks for deployment and scheduling efficiency	✓	Target overtime to problem areas	✓	Implement public policing alternatives: outsourcing, privatization, civilianization, or regionalization	✓
Use Force and Authority Fairly, Efficiently, and Effectively	Establish value-based guidelines for the use of force	✓	Train officers to defuse conflicts and use a wide array of nonlethal devices	✓	Require debriefing after use of force incidents	✓	Develop easily accessible citizen complaint system, as well as mechanism for speedy resolution of complaints; monitor problem officers	✓
Satisfy Consumer Demands/Achieve Legitimacy with Those Policed	Establish a value statement that guides officers to deal with citizens in a patient and helpful manner	✓	Establish a call management system to respond to service requests efficiently	✓	Shape service demand by using community input and educating citizens about services and alternatives	✓	Establish and maintain maximum transparency in operations and performance data	✓

*We emphasize that the adoption of best practices must be tailored to neighborhoods, their problems, and their potential solutions. Not all best practices necessarily apply to all neighborhoods. Moreover, additional best practices are discussed below, and others will be devised as knowledge and skills advance.

1. Reducing Crime and Victimization

Police must consider each of the following six methods of reducing crime and victimization: (1) establishing the “felt” presence of police; (2) persuading people to behave; (3) maintaining order; (4) solving problems; (5) enforcing the law; and (6) reminding people and organizations of their responsibilities. Although they are presented as distinct from each other, often crime prevention and reduction activities overlap and include a similar combination of approaches.

1a. *Presence*: A sense of strong police presence is established through foot and bicycle patrols, regular participation in neighborhood and community activities, and other such activities that increase the quantity and quality of police contacts with citizens.⁵¹ Automobile patrol and special unit undercover operations do not create a felt presence of police because they are not integrated into the neighborhood.

1b. *Persuasion*: Perhaps the best example of successful persuasion of offenders to desist from their criminal behavior by police has been the work of David Kennedy in Boston and other communities, known today as “pulling levers.”⁵² This approach has been tailored for work with chronic offenders, gangs, drug dealing, and gang “wannabes.” It emphasizes joint police, prosecution, and community confrontation of repeat offenders to spell out consequences for continued predatory behavior - and forceful moves to hold offenders accountable if they persist. For example, police departments will contact associates,

friends, and family of an offender with the message that the offender’s behavior will no longer be tolerated; promise that the offender will be targeted with vigorous law enforcement efforts, including the use of informants, if his conduct remains criminal; and proceed to strictly enforce any of the offender’s existing law enforcement relationships, including the aggressive enforcement of probation rules.

1c. *Maintaining Order*: Most commonly identified as broken windows and based on the idea that a causal relationship exists among disorderly behaviors and conditions, breakdown of community controls, and serious crime, this approach concentrates on restoring order to empower neighborhoods and give police increased access to serious offenders. The approach extends to traffic enforcement as well.

1d. *Problem Solving*: Although problem solving can run through all of these outputs, we present it as a separate category. Specifically, it requires a focus on problems (clusters of related activities that occur in particular times or locations) rather than individual criminal acts. A methodology for its use in policing, known as SARA (discussed above), has been developed and used widely. It has been most applicable to problems of disorder and is often coupled with a broken windows approach. Another problem-solving mechanism in use is CompStat (also a tactic for increasing accountability). Problem solving routinely involves police in partnerships and collaboration with representatives of other justice agencies, private sector groups, and

The persuasion approach has been tailored to work with chronic offenders, gangs and drug dealing, and gang “wannabes.” It emphasizes joint police, prosecution, and community confrontation of repeat offenders to spell out consequences for continued predatory behavior – and forceful moves to hold offenders accountable if they persist.

private citizens, working together to identify, understand the contours of specific problems, and craft a combination of law enforcement and extra-law enforcement solutions, such as engaging non-policing agencies of government or community groups, to address the problem.

Problem solving routinely involves police in partnerships and collaboration with representatives of other justice agencies, private sector groups, and private citizens, working together to identify, understand the contours of specific problems, and craft a combination of law enforcement and extra-law enforcement solutions to address the problem.

1e. *Law Enforcement*: Recognizing that law enforcement overlaps with the next broad category, “initiating justice processes” (calling offenders to account), it is still a basic preventive measure that operates through offender incarceration and primary deterrence (“I am or will be deterred by police action in response to me”) and secondary deterrence (“I am deterred by police action in response to others”).

1f. *Reminding Others of Their Responsibilities*: Because police operate 24 hours a day and are distributed throughout cities, they are in a position to identify problems for which other agencies are responsible and should take action, collaborating with police on appropriate issues - for example, zoning, liquor control, probation and parole violations, private security, and health and safety code violations.

2. Effectively Initiating Justice Processes

Effectively initiating justice processes is a means of reducing crime and victimization; even more important, it is a means of achieving justice. Police achieve this goal through arrests, clearances, and conviction rates. Effectively initiating justice processes is one of the more complicated issues in police administration

and tactical development. For the most part, police action in this area takes place through arrests, while clearing cases and obtaining convictions lies within the domain of criminal investigators or detectives.

In many police departments, detective units are firmly established entities that have operated in the same way for decades. Senior personnel, often the elite of a department, most often staff the units. During the 1970s, detectives in many departments were organized into geographically based teams; such arrangements appeared to increase their productivity. During this same period, some departments experimented with the use of “solvability factors,” or information that indicated whether a case was likely to be solved, in determining case priorities, breaking cases down through a form of triage: cases that would solve themselves (many do), those that intensive investigation could likely clear, and those that appeared to be dead ends.

For the most part, detectives have managed to avoid the research scrutiny that has examined patrol functions, and have remained largely unaffected by the evolution of the community policing strategy. Nevertheless, terrorism, especially since 9/11, has brought considerable pressure to bear so that the traditional role of criminal investigation is being reconsidered. This is most evident in the controversy over the role of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in terrorism investigations. Critics of the FBI accuse it of being focused on gaining convictions rather than gathering intelligence to prevent future acts of terrorism. To be sure, the two approaches are not always mutually

exclusive but, depending on the case, they may be.

This same controversy is now beginning to affect local police departments: should the exclusive focus of detectives be on cases and preparing them for prosecution, or should information gained during the conduct of case investigations be used in crime prevention efforts? To give an example: a gang member's killing of a member of another gang often signals the beginning of a revenge cycle. Yet few departments have devised a mechanism, nor is there much motivation on the part of investigators, for sharing such intelligence with line officers or special units that could use it to stop the next violent incident in the cycle. Part of this is tradition; part is turf-related; part is detective intransigence; part is simply a failure to understand the potential of information sharing. None of these explanations, however, constitutes good policy. Consequently, a consensus is growing in the field that criminal investigation capacities of most police departments are underutilized.

At minimum, police departments should consider the following four outputs and identify related benchmarks for evaluating whether they are effectively initiating justice processes. It is important to underscore that none of these benchmarks is an end in itself: police must never lose sight of the overriding goal of preventing and reducing crime independent of the number of arrests, clearances, convictions, and investigations they achieve.

2a. *Arrests (number and quality)*: Despite the measurement problems they present, arrest and booking rates should be benchmarked and measured,

because arrests are the first step in criminal justice processing and are associated with *booking*, the formal police method of processing offenders. We expect that arrests should be reasonable and based on probable cause. Booking should be done rapidly and thoroughly, both in deference to the arrestee and to get the arresting officer back on the street as soon as possible. Benchmarks should be linked both to the number and quality of arrests.

2b. *Clearances*: Clearance rates often indicate crimes solved by police (see discussion of arrests under Outcomes, below). Although standards for clearance rates can vary by department, they should be benchmarked and measured because they are potentially an indicator of police productivity and can provide a basis for holding police units and departments accountable.

2c. *Convictions*: The percentage of cases resolved either by plea bargaining to a lesser charge or by obtaining a guilty plea or verdict in a trial should be benchmarked and measured because such statistics can indicate the extent to which police provide prosecutors with cases that have been investigated legally and constitutionally and that are thorough enough to meet the threshold of probable cause.

2d. *Investigation/Use of Detectives*: The extent to which detectives are involved in CompStat-like practices to identify local problems and develop solutions rather than using a case-by-case approach should be measured and benchmarked, including whether

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detectives routinely share information with patrol and special unit officers.

3. Reducing Fear and Enhancing Personal Security

The basic objective here is identifying what police actions reduce fear. Strong evidence suggests that five sets of activities reduce fear: 1) increasing the presence of police perceived by citizens through police foot patrol, bicycle patrol, and other activities that increase the quantity and quality of police-citizen interactions; 2) restoring order through broken windows approaches; 3) problem-solving efforts that address specific conditions within neighborhoods and communities; 4) reminding organizations of their responsibility; and 5) organizing the self-defense capacity of neighborhoods and communities. The first four activities represent best practices and should be measured and benchmarked according to community priorities. The last activity warrants consideration of the substantial body of research going back to the 1930s that suggests even poor neighborhoods, effectively organized for self-defense, can contribute to crime prevention, order, and fear reduction. Washington Heights in New York City, once one of the most dangerous areas of the city, is an example of the latter; in a place where killers tried to entrap police, children now play as parents watch from their stoops. This was partially a result of conscious efforts by police to help organize neighborhood watch and community patrol efforts. This experience counsels that departments should establish benchmarks linked to activities police use in organizing the self-defense capacity of a community and measure progress toward that goal.

Best practices and benchmarks for improving performance in the maintenance of safety in public spaces should be based on activities such as police patrol of various forms in parks; crafting and implementing order maintenance programs aimed at problems such as street prostitution, drug use, or graffiti; partnering with business improvement district representatives and private security forces in commercial areas, such as in Midtown Manhattan and areas of Seattle; and traffic enforcement on major thoroughfares.

4. Guaranteeing Safety in Public Spaces

“Public spaces” range from parks to streets, sidewalks, commercial areas, malls, schools, public transit facilities (i.e., train and bus stations), and roadways. Best practices and benchmarks for improving performance in the maintenance of safety in public spaces should be based on activities such as police patrol of various forms in parks; crafting and implementing order maintenance programs aimed at problems such as street prostitution, drug use, or graffiti; partnering with business improvement district representatives and private security forces in commercial areas, such as in Midtown Manhattan and areas of Seattle; and traffic enforcement on major thoroughfares.⁵³

5. Using Financial Resources Fairly, Efficiently, and Effectively

The proper use of financial resources is an important indicator of excellence in policing.⁵⁴ To achieve this objective, we recommend establishing the following best practices with appropriate benchmarks to measure performance:

5a. Cost per Citizen: Police departments should carefully measure the trend in policing costs per citizen and should set benchmarks triggering review of the correlation between cost and services actually being provided by police if significant changes in the trend occur.

5b. Deployment Efficiency/Fairness: This benchmark should establish measurable goals for a police department’s allocation system, the basis on which resources and personnel are allocated to neighborhoods or geographical

areas. Deployment patterns are determined by a variety of factors including crime levels, calls for service, population patterns, geographical characteristics (rivers, expressways, or other boundaries), determination of different neighborhoods' capacities for self-defense (e.g., the availability of private security), and other elements. The current best deployment practice has at least two characteristics that at times conflict: first, it is flexible, quickly changing depending upon shifting problems and other criteria; second, it attempts to retain as many permanent patrol assignments as possible to ensure that officers remain in areas long enough to become familiar with them and be familiar to residents and users of the area. At times, both values should be sought by having special units deployed flexibly and patrol officers deployed permanently.

5c. *Scheduling Efficiency*: The demand for service should be measured and workdays and times for relevant police assignments scheduled to ensure available resources will match the demand for service. This will require tracking crime patterns, 911 calls, regular calls for nonemergency incidents, and requests for community meetings.

5d. *Budget Compliance*: Agencies should use cost-control measures to stay within their budgets - an oft-ignored administrative process. Since personnel costs constitute the overwhelming portion of any police budget, the best practice is monthly reporting on expenditure levels against the portion of the budget year that has passed.

5e. *Overtime*: The misuse of overtime is widespread across police agencies, often used for activities that have little impact on agency goals. The best practice is to assign approximately 75 percent of such funds to geographic (district/precincts) and unit (tactical) commanders who will assign overtime to high-performing officers and focus overtime work on improving lagging performance indicators. Real-time overtime expenditure monitoring and policing performance monitoring, through CompStat or other similar policing management practices, can ensure accountability in the use of overtime for this purpose. An instructive example of the effective use of overtime incentives is recounted in the Goldwater Institute's "A New Charter for American Cities," in which Steve Bartlett, former mayor of Dallas, describes making overtime available only to high-performing officers and only if the overtime is performed in underperforming precincts.⁵⁵

5f. *Policing Alternatives*: As discussed in greater detail later, police departments should establish a practice of considering, where appropriate, outsourcing specific functions through civilianization, managed competition, privatization, and regionalization.

Agencies should use cost-control measures to stay within their budgets.

Alternative Models of Policing as a Means of Achieving Fair, Efficient, and Effective Use of Financial Resources

Improving performance in policing ideally should begin with serious efforts within the organization, even if this requires a change in leadership, basic organizational structure, and police

In the challenging fiscal environment local governments currently face, police resources may be insufficient to meet local demand for what the community considers minimal levels of public safety, the local police department may be otherwise unwilling or unable to meet this demand, or civilianizing particular functions or working more closely with other policing organizations may be simply advantageous.

processes - in effect, overhauling the police department. In the challenging fiscal environment local governments currently face, police resources may be insufficient to meet local demand for what the community considers minimal levels of public safety, the local police department may be otherwise unwilling or unable to meet this demand, or civilianizing particular functions or working more closely with other policing organizations may be simply advantageous. It is therefore necessary to consider other options for improving policing and ensuring public safety where police organizations either cannot alone or do not succeed in meeting expectations set by the community: privatization of, or competition for, core functions; outsourcing of special functions; civilianization of special functions; and regionalization - ranging from core police functions to special functions.⁵⁶

Historically, such ideas have been a hard sell in American policing. Part of the objection, especially during the mid-century reform era, has been the idea that since police deal with some confidential matters, all policing operations should remain secret. This secretiveness was abetted by the “thin blue line” and “blue curtain” ideologies: police know best; citizens should passively support police; and citizen and political oversight of police operations constitute a form of corruption. The development of strong police unions in many parts of the country during the 1960s further supported this position. Many unions resisted all forms of civilianization or outsourcing or, when some form of civilianization was forced on them, supported and obtained legislation prohibiting sworn personnel from working under the direction of civilians. Some police unions even lobbied successfully

against legislation permitting the creation of Business Improvement Districts (BIDs), demanding that all policing in the jurisdiction be carried out by local police. The most extreme forms of resistance approached a level of paranoia, such as the argument that even stenographic workers should be sworn armed officers able to defend police stations if they came under attack.⁵⁷

The result was that many officers were removed from the core functions of preventing crime, reducing fear, and investigating crimes and arresting suspects. Instead officers did stenographic work, managed automobile fleets, drove vans, developed and maintained information technologies, photographed crime scenes and, perhaps, provided photographs for employee identification cards, ran crime labs, and did other odd jobs for which they were with rare exception neither prepared nor competent. Outcomes often were disastrous: mismanaged automobile fleets, barely or mal-functioning information technology, inept fiscal controls, and botched work by crime labs. Perhaps most important, highly trained and expensive officers were kept from frontline policing, the core function of the agency.⁵⁸ This was not an inconsiderable problem. One of the major findings of the RAND Corporation’s 1975 study of criminal investigation was that detective work, as conducted then, consisted primarily of gathering materials for court hearings - easily a secretarial job.⁵⁹ Unpopular or not among police, however, these options have been adopted in many locations.

Privatization of and/or Competition for Core Police Functions is perhaps the most controversial of the options. If one takes

a broad historical view of Anglo-Saxon policing, it is clear that public policing as we have come to know it is a relatively new historical development dating back only to the mid-19th century. Before then, policing was primarily a private or communal responsibility. As policing matured, its domain expanded to include near total responsibility for policing neighborhoods and communities. President Johnson's Commission, undeniably one of the most powerful forces shaping mid-century policing and criminal justice thinking, virtually ignored private security and other community efforts to control crime: in effect, using sociologist Clifford Shearing's term, it "de-privatized" policing.⁶⁰ The role of citizens and communities was assumed to be exclusively one of supporting police both morally and financially, while deferring in all policing matters.

Community policing represented a backlash against this trend, not only recognizing the powerful shift toward the use of private security following World War II but also incorporating the idea that police needed both consent from (moral support), and collaboration with, a broad array of private and public sector sources to be successful. In effect, policing has moved toward "re-privatization." One sees this movement in a variety of dimensions, perhaps most conspicuously in the development of BIDs and other forms of private sector "ownership" of public spaces. Bryant Park, located in New York City immediately behind the public library in Midtown Manhattan, is perhaps the most classic example of the latter. After several drug-related homicides and the failure of NYPD's two attempts to regain and maintain control of the park during the 1980s, it was fenced in and closed.

Under private sponsorship, Bryant Park reopened in the 1990s and is now a jewel of an urban park. Details about how this was accomplished are readily available in case studies: much of the emphasis lay in a focus by private security upon attention to physical conditions, and misdemeanor enforcement.⁶¹

The point of this example – at least at this time in history – is that the private sector was able to achieve a level of control over public spaces that police could, or would, not.⁶² Other circumstances have developed as well during the last few decades in which public police share the conduct of core policing functions with representatives of the private sector. In many cities, security officers, ranging, for example, from unarmed uniformed guides in Baltimore to armed ex-police and FBI agents in Fort Worth, Texas, patrol public spaces. In Portland, Oregon, BID representatives share common radio networks and locker facilities with police to facilitate communication and cooperation.

Managed competition for carrying out core police functions may or may not be a form of privatization. Although current events cause us to associate the term with the delivery of medical services, more broadly understood, managed competition is a market-based approach in which consumers can choose from an array of competing service providers.⁶³ The purpose of managed competition is to control costs and improve the quality of services. In policing this could take a variety of forms: public agencies (state police, sheriff departments, and local police departments) competing to provide police services to an entire community, a section of a community, or a special community function or area

Community policing represented a backlash against this trend of minimal citizen involvement, not only recognizing the powerful shift toward the use of private security following World War II but also incorporating the idea that police needed both consent from, and collaboration with, a broad array of private and public sector sources to be successful.

(e.g., transportation, parks, schools, public housing projects), or private sector agencies competing among themselves or against public agencies to police communities, sections of communities, or special community areas or functions.

Examples of public agencies competing to provide services are relatively few, and most often the services pertain to special policing in limited areas, such as public transportation, parks, or schools. The Los Angeles police and sheriff's departments regularly compete for contracts to police public transportation. We find many more instances of public agencies collaborating with and even deferring to private sector policing in locations such as gated communities, parks, and high-pedestrian traffic downtown areas of large cities.⁶⁴ Generally, even when public police defer to private police, public police assume greater responsibility for dealing with felonies, including criminal investigation of felonies and violent street crime, while private security may deal with enforcement of regulations and misdemeanors. We know of no communities in which public policing competes with private agencies to provide all police services, although conceptually it is not inconceivable. We do find managed competition in other parts of the justice system, such as the operation of prisons in the corrections sector.

Outsourcing is related directly to the option of privatizing police functions. It refers to the organizational practice of contracting with an outside agency for the provision of specific services other than core functions that otherwise would be provided by the organization itself. Purposes of outsourcing include cost savings, increasing the organization's

capacity to concentrate on its core functions, improving the quality of services that can be outsourced, and reducing the organizational need for and costs of hiring and training new employees or retraining extant employees. Like privatization, outsourcing is an underutilized approach in police management, not to mention city government in general, and should be considered by localities.

One strong proponent of outsourcing was former Indianapolis mayor Stephen Goldsmith (1992-2000). His desire was "to move every possible hour of policing" to its core function of being out on the street preventing crime.⁶⁵ He tried to determine: "What does a sworn officer do best?" "What does a civilian do best?" "What does an outsourcing company do best?" Key to his approach was the need to get at least three issues "correct in the contract": quality control, privacy, and confidentiality. The details of "getting it right," while beyond the scope of this paper, are central to achieving the goals of outsourcing noted above.⁶⁶ Eventually, confronted with the typical police resistance surrounding "security issues," Goldsmith relied more heavily on civilianization than outsourcing.

Civilianization, an alternative to outsourcing, refers to police departments hiring civilians to staff positions for which no special police training is required. The positions that civilian personnel can fill range from fairly routine secretarial work to complicated information technology management. Civilianization can reduce costs, keep police involved in their core functions, and access special technical and professional skills. As Mayor Goldsmith's experience suggests, civilianization

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meets considerably less resistance than outsourcing. In fact, it has become routine in most police departments.

Regionalization refers to police departments cooperating or coordinating functions through two distinct approaches. The first combines all police forces in a geographical area. In practice, this generally applies to county and city police merging to provide all police services. Two examples are Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, and Las Vegas, Nevada.⁶⁷ The second takes place when police departments in a region combine in the provision of specific non-core functions such as police academies, crime labs, and jails. The 9/11 terrorist attack gave a strong push to the latter form of regionalization. Supported by both state and federal sources, regions created “fusion centers” that at first concentrated on terrorism, but as knowledge about terrorism became more sophisticated, shifted to concentrating on all crimes.⁶⁸ Regionalization, especially merging of all police functions, has long been on the agenda of mid 20th-century reformers. For good or ill, most communities want to control their own police and have resisted regionalization, pushing merger of all functions at once largely off the table. However, regionalization of discrete special functions, such as SWAT (special weapons and tactics), is showing considerable promise and progress.

Considering these various options, we recommend outsourcing, civilianization, and regionalization of particular functions as courses for police departments to pursue when they are faced with the challenges of improving the delivery of policing services, and with limited financial resources. We also cautiously recommend managed

competition and privatization, noting that both methods of service delivery raise significant but manageable problems related to accountability, oversight, and relationships of policing or security agencies with the local community.

Before undertaking managed competition or privatization, for example, localities need to ensure that contracts contain appropriate assurances that citizen expectations will be met and that community values and priorities will have a fundamental role in shaping policing policy and performance. Furthermore, because irreparable harm can result if there is a failure to furnish the core function of criminal law enforcement, contingency plans, such as cross-coverage agreements with neighboring municipalities, should be adopted in anticipation of the possible termination or cessation of private policing contracts. Meeting these minimum requirements and providing satisfactory answers to other questions⁶⁹ may prove especially challenging in large-scale privatization or managed competition projects. Nevertheless, collaborations between police departments and private security agencies, where the latter do not completely assume public police functions but work with police within circumscribed functional and geographical areas, such as those associated with BIDs or similar types of organizations, can be extremely valuable. Indeed, the evidence suggests that for bounded areas - public transportation systems, parks, sports arenas, or public housing developments and the like - localities should consider managed competition and privatization for provision of specific basic policing services.

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Therefore, to summarize this section, we recommend that policymakers and political leaders:

- *Pursue processes of re-privatization inherent in community policing through encouraging the development of BIDs and other private sector approaches to crime prevention, and supporting police collaboration and coordination with them.* Managed competition among policing agencies may prove more workable in particular settings but still carries significant problems. Privatization of *all* core police functions does not appear to be a viable political option for most cities, and we view it only as a last resort.
- *Pursue outsourcing.* While still viewed skeptically by many in policing and subject to resistance, outsourcing will be an important means of addressing crime and safety problems as information technology, crime analysis, problem solving, and other such functions gain in value, acceptance, and complexity. Just as most police departments have come to rely on civilian employees routinely, outsourcing should also increase.
- *Encourage civilianization as departments adjust to declining budgets and the need for special skills.*
- *Consider regionalization of particular functions, with fusion centers being an example.*

Because the use of force is a highly discretionary police activity, police departments should establish value-based guidelines for the use of force that instill in police officers the priorities that must be considered before using force.

6. Using Force and Authority Fairly, Efficiently, and Effectively

This sixth set of outputs can serve as both internal (among patrol units within a department) and external benchmarks, and as outcome and output benchmarks. We recommend the following benchmarks and best practices for using force and authority fairly, efficiently, and effectively:

6a. *Value-based Guidelines for Use of Force:* Because the use of force is a highly discretionary police activity, police departments should establish value-based guidelines for the use of force that instill in police officers the priorities that must be considered before using force.

6b. *An Easily Accessible Citizen Complaint System:* Complaints must be courteously and promptly accepted in locations accessible to and easily identified by citizens. Many believe that having a complaint system available via the Internet is an essential part of any serious attempt to make a complaint system easily accessible. In Arizona, Chandler, Phoenix, Mesa, and Tucson all have readily available Internet-based complaint systems.

6c. *Mechanisms for Both Informal and Formal Resolution of Complaints against Police:* Many, if not most, complaints have to do with impolite or caustic police behavior: most citizens would be happy with a simple apology. Care must be taken, however, to ensure that police departments do not apply pressure to avoid formal complaints, and that those received are handled professionally.

6d. *Speedy Resolution of All Complaints:* Both citizens and officers deserve speedy resolution. Delays will lead to decay of citizen confidence that they are receiving fair treatment. For officers, pending complaints often result in bad assignments or delays in promotion.

6e. *Training:* Officers need to be trained in the development of verbal and tactical skills to defuse conflicts and in the use of the array of devices they now have available to exercise control over citizens. This training should be linked to departmental values and guidelines.

6f. *Quality Debriefing:* Police departments have been reluctant to debrief their experiences in handling crisis events; yet they have much to learn by debriefing. For example, lessons learned from debriefing the Columbine, CO school massacre taught police that they could not wait for special units in an active shooting situation.⁷⁰

6g. *Monitoring Troublesome Officers:* Evidence shows that a small number of officers are responsible for a large percentage of cases in which charges of police brutality and abuse are brought. Departments should set up a monitoring system to identify such officers, attempt to find means through which their behavior can be changed, assign them to low-conflict jobs, or terminate their police employment.

7. Satisfying Customer Demand/ Achieving Legitimacy with Those Policed

Satisfying customer demand and establishing legitimacy with citizens has been a special problem in minority

communities. Part of this issue is historic; part a residue of cultural tradition. Regardless, there are many examples of police departments that were once seriously at odds with neighborhoods and communities but now have supportive, relatively harmonious relations with diverse communities. Los Angeles is an example of such a turnaround; Boston is another.⁷¹ We have learned from Los Angeles that police can restructure their relationship with communities while aggressively working to lower crime rates. Indeed, the good news is that reducing victimization and restoring order is one of the prerequisites for establishing police legitimacy.

However, in pursuing the goal of achieving legitimacy and satisfying customer demand, it is important to remember that police should not do for citizens what they can and should do for themselves. Moreover, citizens might ask or demand of police that they do inappropriate things - such as taking action that deprives other citizens of their rights. The most critical issue in servicing demand is dealing with 911. The evidence regarding 911 is strong: rapid response to calls for service provides little benefit in solving problems or preventing crime. (This does not refer to rapid response for either fire departments or emergency medical service - only to police service.) This does not mean that police should not respond rapidly to service calls. It means that police departments should not be organized or officers assigned around the purpose of reducing response times. Managing calls for service accordingly is essential for all police departments.

Subject to these caveats, we recommend the following best practices for dealing with citizen demands and achieving legitimacy,

Evidence shows that a small number of officers are responsible for a large percentage of cases in which charges of police brutality and abuse are brought. Departments should set up a monitoring system to identify such officers, attempt to find means through which their behavior can be changed, assign them to low-conflict jobs, or terminate their police employment.

and the development of corresponding benchmarks:

7a. *Value Statement*: A clear set of value statements should guide officers as they deal with citizen expression of their demands that emphasizes understanding, patience, and helpfulness without officers being manipulated to pursue inappropriate goals or actions. Both Tempe and Chandler provide strong examples of such statements on their police department websites.⁷²

7b. *Call Management System*: Although officers should rush to emergency calls, the tradition of staying in automobiles just to respond immediately to calls for service should end. Riding in cars, waiting for calls, is not good police work. Second, the idea that “good” police response is responding to all calls by sending a car is wasteful of police resources. Alternative responses to calls for service should be a high priority of police departments. Police can service many calls via telephone: for example, in Milwaukee, officers on light duty because of injury or illness handle a substantial portion of calls. Citizen approval of police service delivered in this fashion is quite high. In Arizona, the Mesa Police Department has compiled a useful pamphlet that can be printed from its website and distributed, listing telephone numbers and contacts for various types of police and other safety-related assistance - clearly distinguishing emergency-911 calls from other types of calls.

7c. *Shaping Citizen Demands*: Police should actively educate citizens about the services they offer and available

alternative services. Such programs should not be focused on sloughing off responsibilities but as a means for citizens to obtain better services more quickly. Phoenix, Mesa, Tucson, Chandler, and Tempe, for example, all run regular citizens’ police academies, which can help educate citizens in this way.

7d. *Transparency*: Frequent contact with citizens, and opening up police “business” insofar as possible, is key. Using Los Angeles as an example, portions of many CompStat meetings were open to neighborhood residents and interested citizens (discussions of confidential matters, such as suspects, were not open). Officers can update citizens on activities in their neighborhoods regularly at association meetings. The Internet offers many more opportunities for transparency. Both Tucson and Mesa present their crime data in easily accessible forms: Mesa provides crime data in a CompStat format; Tucson uses a simple format that allows year-to-year comparison.

7e. *Handling of Complaints*: (See 6b, c, d.)

7f. *Regular Collaboration and Sharing of Responsibility*: Community input should occur not only to identify major community problems but also so that the community can share responsibility for managing those problems.

Measuring Outcomes to Determine the Effectiveness of Police Performance

At the outset, it is clear that measuring police performance today has become a more comprehensive and multifaceted

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undertaking as we recognize, value, and expect police to perform a wider range of duties, both crime and non-crime related, and accomplish a broader set of outcomes than previously. Nevertheless, assessing police performance and measuring outcomes, if done well, should enable a community and police department to (1) determine whether police achieve the goals that they, and the community, have set and whether they attain these goals in the manner desired, and (2) improve policing itself by setting standards of practice (benchmarks) and establishing expected outcomes.

Accordingly, to measure outcomes we must begin with citizen priorities about what is important in either a city or district; add to this the problems that the area confronts based on additional sources (police data can reveal problems that citizens may or may not be aware of); identify the means used to deal with the problem (best practices); and finally, select outcome data sources that pertain to the problems of the area and are feasible given the resources available. We will end up with a mix of outcome measures particular to a city or district, all of which are likely to have some shortcomings. Nevertheless, the mix of measures allows for cross-verification (in social science this is known as “triangulation”) and greater confidence in the reliability of the indicators.⁷³ With this as background, we recommend using the following outcome measurement criteria according to the seven ultimate objectives of policing described earlier (see Figure 5).⁷⁴

1. Reducing Crime and Victimization:

- *Uniform Crime Reporting:* We discussed earlier the problems

of using the UCR program for performance measurement. UCR statistics measure only *reported and recorded* crime and are vulnerable to manipulation. Likewise, an increase in certain types of offenses could indicate that more people are willing to report such crimes as rape because of the improvement of their handling by police. Nevertheless, the UCR measurements can be reliable and, when they are, should be utilized for benchmarking and measurement. Two indicators, homicide and car theft, are generally considered to be reliable and accurate and should be used as benchmarks across police departments.

- *Victimization Surveys:* Victimization surveys, which examine a random sample of a given population, provide a more accurate picture of crime levels and also provide a check on UCR measurements. They are, however, expensive to conduct and also have shortcomings such as under- and overreporting. But the perfect must not be the enemy of the good, and we recommend the use of well-crafted victimization surveys as part of a triangulation approach.

2. Effectively Initiating Justice Processes:

- *Arrests:* We discussed earlier the problems with using arrest as an output indicator. The same concerns arise in using it to measure outcomes. Definitions of arrest can vary among jurisdictions. Using arrest as a sign of productivity can lead to over-criminalization, especially of minority populations. This characteristic can

Assessing police performance and measuring outcomes, if done well, should enable a community and police department to determine whether police achieve the goals that they, and the community, have set and whether they attain these goals in the manner desired, and to improve policing itself by setting standards of practice and establishing expected outcomes.

Figure 5: A Balanced Scorecard of Outcome Measurement*

Objectives				
Reduce Crime and Victimization	UCR statistics for homicides and car thefts	☑	Crime victimization survey statistics	☑
Effectively Initiate Justice Processes	Quality arrest and clearance statistics	☑	Conviction and guilty-plea statistics	☑
Reduce Fear and Enhance Personal Security	Residential sales/purchase statistics	☑	Average business closing hours	☑
Ensure Safety in Public Spaces	Counts of public usage	☑	Property values and rental costs	☑
Use Financial Resources Fairly, Efficiently, and Effectively	Cost of policing per citizen	☑	Overtime expenditures	☑
Use Force Fairly, Efficiently, and Effectively	Complaints filed against officers	☑	Liability suit settlement amounts	☑
Satisfy Consumer Demands/Achieve Legitimacy with Those Policed	Attitudinal survey statistics	☑	Response times	☑

Clearances are vulnerable to the same definitional problems as arrest. However, clearances are probably more reliable for internal rather than external benchmarking. Again, if approached with eyes wide open to the weaknesses of clearance measurement, clearances should be utilized as a measure of performance as part of a triangulation approach.

*We emphasize that the adoption of outcome measurements must be tailored to neighborhoods, their problems, and their potential solutions. Not all outcome measurements necessarily apply to all neighborhoods. Moreover, additional outcome measurements are discussed below, and others will be devised as knowledge and skills advance.

weaken the value of arrests as a benchmark for comparing different police organizations. With proper guidance, however, arrests can serve as an important internal benchmark within departments and should be utilized for triangulation.

- *Clearances:* Clearances are vulnerable to the same definitional problems as arrest.⁷⁵ Moreover, clearances can be manufactured by officers

or units - for example, if they offer to trade lessening the charge or recommending leniency in sentencing in exchange for the offender accepting responsibility for additional crimes, such as burglaries. Clearances are probably more reliable for internal (within departments) rather than external (between departments) benchmarking. Again, if approached with eyes-wide-open to the weaknesses of clearance

measurement, clearances should be utilized as a measure of performance as part of a triangulation approach.

- *Convictions*: Convictions and other forms of case handling like plea bargaining should be considered as outcome measures. However, given that such processes are largely under the control of prosecution, and that many prosecutors are unwilling to take any cases to court that are not certain, convictions can be more reflective of prosecutorial policies than police performance. As part a triangulation approach, measuring convictions for benchmarking is recommended.

- *Social and Economic Indicators*: There is some overlap here with the next category (4). Measures might include real estate data indicating numbers of citizens buying homes in a neighborhood or moving in, as opposed to leaving; numbers of businesses and financial institutions opening or closing; or information on whether businesses such as restaurants, athletic clubs, recreation facilities, grocery, and drugstores stay open in the evening. While not strictly an outcome measure, such indicators may suggest developing trends that are relevant to a triangulation approach.

3. Reducing Fear and Enhancing Personal Security:

- *Attitudinal Surveys*: Like victimization surveys, attitudinal surveys can provide information about levels of fear in communities that should be used for both internal and external benchmarking (if the surveys and methodologies coincided). Although expensive, they cost less than victimization surveys. Such surveys can measure both reported attitudes and behaviors (e.g., purchase of weapons). Tempe, for example, regularly surveys citizens both on its own and through an outside organization.
- *Focus Groups and Other Feedback Sources (Neighborhood Associations, Crime Watch Groups, Small Business Owners)*: This method is used to obtain attitudinal information from residents and citizens who are stakeholders in the neighborhood.

4. Guaranteeing Safety in Public Spaces:

- *Counts of Public Usage*: Police can use observers to count or revenues to register increased or decreased use of public spaces - public transportation, parks, zoos, public toilets, sidewalks, and malls.
- *Traffic Records*: Traffic records can provide data about accidents, deaths, injuries, and damage and should be considered for outcome measurement of related policing activities.
- *Property Values and Rental Costs*: Real estate, tax, and other records should be used to determine the impact of crime and fear (or lack thereof) on property and commercial interests. Trends in these statistics should be considered as a component of outcome measurement and benchmarking.

Like victimization surveys, attitudinal surveys can provide information about levels of fear in communities that should be used for both internal and external benchmarking.

5. Using Financial Resources Fairly, Efficiently, and Effectively:

Department data or data from outsourcing efforts should be reviewed to determine whether desirable outcomes have been achieved in the following metrics: (a) cost per citizen, (b) deployment efficiency/fairness, (c) scheduling efficiency, (d) budget compliance, and (e) overtime expenditures.

6. Using Force and Authority Fairly, Efficiently, and Effectively:

- *Analysis of Citizen Complaints:* Such an analysis should examine the substance, numerical trends in, and promptness with which complaints are handled.
- *Observations of Complaint Process:* One method we recommend for evaluating such a process is to walk several people, perhaps actors, through the complaint process and record their experiences.
- *Settlements in Liability Suits*
- *Police Shootings*
- *Review of Guidelines and Training Material*
- *Review of Records of Debriefings*

7. Satisfying Customer Demands/Achieving Legitimacy with Those Policed:

- *Response Times:* Departmental data are readily available, although given our understandings about the efficacy of rapid response, they provide

only limited information about the effectiveness of police response.

- *Evaluation of Alternative Responses to Calls for Service:* Follow-up telephone interviews can be conducted relatively inexpensively with citizens who have called for service.
- *Surveys and/or Interviews with Political and Organizational Elites:* These surveys would provide information about both the level of credibility of and trust in the police department.
- *Attitudinal Surveys:* Discussed previously, under 3.

How To Implement High-Performance Policing

We have recommended a range of best practices, corresponding benchmarks, and output and outcome measures for police that represent decades of an increasingly successful evolution in policing theory. Admittedly, most of these have weaknesses, which we have discussed. Our proposed solution to this problem is to *use multiple measurements of a variety of performance criteria (described earlier) for the purpose of triangulation* (cross-verification) as part of a *balanced scorecard*. Such performance benchmarking and measurement no doubt involve constant and transparent monitoring and feedback to facilitate both achievement of goals and improvement in police performance, as they allow for timely, ongoing adjustment of priorities and processes (see Figures 4 and 5).⁷⁶ Screenshots from the CompStat management program maintained by the City of Los Angeles exemplify state-of-the-

Department data or data from outsourcing efforts should be reviewed to determine whether desirable outcomes have been achieved in the following metrics: cost per citizen, deployment efficiency/fairness, scheduling efficiency, budget compliance, and overtime expenditures.

art outcome measurement with respect to various ultimate policing objectives (see Figures 6 through 9).

The next question is how a department should actually identify desirable, achievable, and measurable targets for performance in view of the typical pluralism and variation by district and city in urban problems that citizens and police confront. In addition to accommodating reasonable community preferences and priorities as discussed above, the solution to this problem lies in tailoring performance

benchmarks to those successfully employed in similar localities or districts.

To tailor output and outcome measures, we recommend looking to other cities for performance and outcome benchmarks (see Figure 10). For example, no city can afford to ignore what has happened in New York City. While it can be argued that New York is like no other city in the United States, what happened there was so profound that the basic principles leading to success – especially problem analysis, managerial accountability, and leadership

Figure 6: Reducing Crime and Victimization*

VIOLENT CRIMES	08/01/10 TO 08/28/10	07/04/10 TO 07/31/10	% Change
HOMICIDE	9	15	-40%
RAPE	11	13	-15%
ROBBERY	237	276	-14%
AGGRAVATED ASSULTS	266	277	-4%
TOTAL VIOLENT	523	581	-10%

PROPERTY CRIMES	08/01/10 TO 08/28/10	07/04/10 TO 07/31/10	% Change
BURGLARY	315	348	-9%
GTA	301	358	-16%
BTFA	270	389	-31%
PERSONAL/OTHER THEFT	334	392	-15%
TOTAL PROPERTY	1220	1487	-18%
TOTAL PART I	1743	2068	-16%
CHILD/SPOUSAL ABUSE (PART I & II)*	233	233	0%
SHOTS FIRED	82	120	-32%
SHOOTING VICTIMS	40	59	-32%

To tailor output and outcome measures, we recommend looking to other cities for performance and outcome benchmarks.

*Figures 6 through 9 are only meant as illustrations of what outcome measurements can be assessed. As discussed in connection with Figure 5, many other outcome measurements are highly relevant to assessing performance and should be considered as part of a balanced scorecard. Moreover, outcome measurements must be carefully tailored to neighborhoods, their problems, and their potential solutions. Not all outcome measurements necessarily apply to all neighborhoods.

Figure 7: Effectively Initiating Justice Process

ARRESTS	08/01/10 TO 08/28/10	07/04/10 TO 07/31/10	% Change
HOMICIDE	8	9	-11%
RAPE	6	5	20%
ROBBERY	74	80	-8%
AGGRAVATED ASSAULTS**	200	171	17%
BURGLARY	59	80	-26%
LARCENY	114	114	0%
AUTO THEFT	61	57	7%
TOTAL VIOLENT	288	265	9%
TOTAL PART I	522	516	1%
TOTAL ALL ARRESTS	2341	2231	0%

TYPE OF CRIME INVESTIGATED	July 2010 CRIME CLEARANCE RATE %						
	Southwest	Harbor	77th Street	Southeast	OSB Gang Homicide	OSB	Citywide
Criminal Homicide					77	56	65
Forcible Rape	500		25			80	65
Robbery	28	63	25	27		30	32
Aggravated Assault	38	23	49	43		42	48
273.5 PC*	100	33		200		80	81
Burglary	10	11	8	8		9	13
Larceny	19	15	9	7		13	14
Grand Theft*	14	26	16	13		17	19
Grand Theft Person*							13
B/TFMV*	16	1	7	3		6	5
Auto Theft	2	7	20	14		12	11
Part I Totals	19	16	19	16	92	18	19
Child Abuse		-100	100			27	40
Other Felony	62	45	47	52		51	55
Other MISD	60	38	38	32		43	44
TOTALS (Crime)	34	26	28	26	92	29	31

Figure 8: Using Financial Resources Fairly, Efficiently, and Effectively

SICK/IOD			
	YTD '10 thru DP 7	YTD '09 thru DP 7	Change
Sick Hours	65,152	56,252	16%
IOD Hours	35,885	34,694	3%
Total Hours	101,037	90,946	11%
FY 2010/2011 SWORN ACCOUNTABLE OVERTIME USAGE			
Total Annual Goal			269,379
DP 7/2010 thru DP 8/2010 PP2 YTD Goal Hours			33,478
DP 7/2010 thru DP 8/2010 PP2 YTD Total Hours Used			27,104
DP 7/2010 thru DP 8/2010 PP2 % Used vs. YTD Goal			81%

Figure 9: Using Force and Authority Fairly, Efficiently, and Effectively

Area Complaints						
	01/01/10 TO 07/31/10	01/01/09 TO 07/31/09	Percent Change			
Complaints Issued	484	559	-13%			
Initial Classification						
Chain of Command	240	271	-11%			
Failure to Appear	7	14	-50%			
Failure to Qualify	10	13	-23%			
Internal Affairs Group	214	214	0%			
Preventable T/Cs	0	30				
Use of Force	13	16	-19%			
Area Complaints						
	Closed 01/01/10 TO 07/31/10	Closed 01/01/09 TO 07/31/09	Closed Percent Change	Sustained 01/01/10 TO 07/31/10	Sustained 01/01/09 TO 07/31/09	Sustained Percent Change
Complaints Closed	576	522	10%	56	93	-40%
Final Allegation						
Discourtesy	185	134	38%	5	2	150%
Failure to Appear	12	15	-20%	5	5	0%
Failure to Qualify	9	14	-36%	5	7	-29%
Improper Remarks	3	10	-70%	1	2	-50%
Neglect of Duty	146	121	21%	19	15	27%
Preventable T/Cs	3	57	-95%	1	42	-98%
Unauthorized Force	78	73	7%	0	0	N.C.*
Unauthorized Tactics	31	26	19%	0	4	

Figure 10: Hypothetical Comparable Measurement Scorecard: Mesa vs. Los Angeles*

	Homicides per 100,000 Residents (UCR)	Arrests per 100,000 Residents (UCR)	Clearance Rate	Complaints against Officers per 100,000 Residents
Mesa	0	15.1	33%	3.4
Los Angeles	8	13	31%	4.8
Difference from Comparable Jurisdiction	-8	+1.9	+2%	-1.4

*Figure 10 is only meant as an illustration of what outcome measurements can be compared across jurisdictions. As discussed in connection with Figure 5, many other outcome measurements are highly relevant to assessing performance and should be considered as part of a balanced scorecard. Moreover, the comparison of outcome measurements across jurisdictions must be carefully tailored to comparing similar neighborhoods with similar problems. Not all outcome measurements necessarily apply to all neighborhoods.

It must be emphasized that adopting best practices, benchmarks, and measurement policies is not enough. High-performance policing also requires strong leadership.

– deserve to be understood and considered for adaptation elsewhere. Comparisons can be drawn as well between police districts of different cities that share similar characteristics, as a process of internal benchmarking. Nearly all cities have districts that are roughly comparable. For example, Milwaukee’s District 3, an inner-city minority district, might not look much like Tempe’s District 1, a downtown university district, but it certainly looks a lot like District 5, another inner-city minority district in Tempe.

Accordingly, every city and police department needs to develop (1) a research and development capacity for searching out best policing practices and outcome measures in light of the problems it identifies and seeks to address, and (2) a formal measurement process as well as a capacity for ongoing documentation, monitoring, assessing, and feeding back information for adjustment purposes during implementation of programs

and processes. Constant monitoring and feedback are essential to facilitate both achievement of goals and improvement in police performance, as they allow for timely, ongoing adjustment of priorities and processes.⁷⁷ Where in-house capacity does not exist, police departments should consider partnerships with universities or research organizations, as well as to assist periodically in conducting community surveys and formal evaluations of policing activities on a limited or wide scale.⁷⁸

Leadership Still Matters

Finally, it must be emphasized that adopting best practices, benchmarks, and measurement policies is not enough. High-performance policing also requires strong leadership. Effective organizational leadership consists of seven essential elements: (1) having a clear vision of the organizational mission that is in-step with the demands of major players in the organization’s environment (mayor and

other key politicians, citizens, private sector interests, etc.); (2) articulating this vision in terms that capture and excite both external constituencies and operational personnel; (3) identifying key leaders in the organization, obtaining their commitment, and placing them in positions where they can exert influence and control; (4) identifying and isolating - or better yet, winning over - naysayers; (5) setting expectations and performance boundaries; (6) developing interactive control mechanisms; and (7) implementing consequences for performance.⁷⁹

Vision: The idea of an organizational vision, like that of organizational values, has often degraded into a cliché: a motto on the wall for the benefit of visitors and clients rather than a powerful driving force. The most successful example of the power that vision can have in policing is from New York City. There the demand for restoration of order, especially in Manhattan but throughout the city as well, was initially recognized in the private sector (e.g., BIDS and community groups), then was expressed politically with the election of Rudy Giuliani, a Republican in an overwhelmingly Democratic city, and ultimately became the core function of the NYPD. Virtually everyone from the mayor on down shared this common vision of the basic business of the police - restoring order in the city. Both Chandler and Tempe provide strong vision statements on their police department websites: Tempe's strategic plan flows from its mission statement; Chandler's vision statement is available in an easily distributed foldout format. Other cities must identify and actively pursue the unique "vision" that will guide police and other actors who will work with them.

Expectations and Boundaries: Expectations for accomplishment must be developed for the organization as a whole, units in the organization, and performers within those units. These expectations need to be put forward in ways that support the core functions of the organization. Such expectations should be clearly defined, measurable, measurable over time, and easily collected, with results fed back to the organization, unit, or individual in simple format and terms.⁸⁰ Although it is difficult to tell employees exactly what they should not do, in policing - where decisions are highly discretionary - leaders must identify and communicate clearly to employees those actions that are impermissible. Telling employees what lines they may not cross sets minimum standards of performance. Such boundaries allow for the use of discretion, but within established guidelines.⁸¹ Accountability for achieving what is expected must then be enforced at every level in the organization.

Interactive Control Mechanisms: Such processes involve face-to-face conversations and confrontations regarding individual unit or organizational performance, with the explicit purpose of promoting accountability for policing activities and outcomes within a particular area. The NYPD's CompStat is the best example of an interactive control mechanism. In it, middle managers (captains) openly discuss their areas of responsibility in front of superiors and peers. Such systems allow leaders of decentralized organizations to involve themselves in the planning and execution of problem-solving procedures that are both consistent with the overall vision of the organization and responsive to local demands and needs. Moreover, mid-managers can learn from both their leaders and their peers.

Expectations for accomplishment must be developed for the organization as a whole, units in the organization, and performers within those units. These expectations need to be put forward in ways that support the core functions of the organization. Such expectations should be clearly defined, measurable, measurable over time, and easily collected, with results fed back to the organization, unit, or individual in simple format and terms.

Consequences: Both superior and inadequate performance must have consequences. Inadequate performance can be addressed through retraining, discipline, demotion, and termination. Superior performance can lead to promotion, monetary reward, additional benefits (time off), better assignment within rank, public recognition, and other formal and informal rewards. Although the provision of consequences can be difficult in light of civil service rules and unions, good leaders find ways to acknowledge and implement consequences for work done or not done. Similar to what has been previously recommended by the Goldwater Institute,⁸² prudent leaders should strongly consider outsourcing services as a consequence of intractable underperformance.

The essence of mature community policing as practiced most effectively and efficiently today lies in the recognition that citizens themselves possess the freedom, liberty, and much of the responsibility for maintaining order and safety in public spaces. Policing performed well acknowledges, respects, and even defers to citizens in these efforts.

Concluding Recommendations For Arizona

The essence of mature community policing as practiced most effectively and efficiently today lies in the recognition that citizens themselves possess the freedom, liberty, and much of the responsibility for maintaining order and safety in public spaces. Policing performed well acknowledges, respects, and even defers to citizens in these efforts. Vigilant individual residents help to keep their neighborhoods safe through everyday social interaction. Neighborhood associations carry out collective measures - through forming citizen patrols; cleaning up streets and parks; setting up centers for youth to gather; identifying troublesome hot spots where gangs, prostitutes, or drug activity are threatening safety; and notifying and working with police. Citizen groups in communities often form to eliminate graffiti or pursue other crime

problems such as domestic violence, while business improvement districts and private security organizations all play important roles in keeping residential, commercial, and public areas safe and secure. In sum, citizens properly exercise significant rights and responsibilities in securing safety in their communities; within the boundaries of safety and legality, police should not do for citizens what they can and should do for themselves - but police *do* have core functions, and in performing those functions, they should be held to the highest standards.

From the foregoing discussion, then, we hope that readers will take away the following concluding points that are applicable to Arizona, as well as to virtually all other U.S. jurisdictions, many of which have already adopted them:

- *Police and the Community:* As part of its strategic planning, a police department should identify specific goals and tactics for establishing a strong working relationship with citizens and local private and public organizations for purposes of ascertaining citizen priorities for crime control, gaining their agreement concerning strategies for addressing citizen and police priorities, and determining how citizens will participate in overall efforts. Police should then monitor relationships with citizens as part of formal police measurement processes and through periodic surveys or other means for collecting and analyzing such data.
- *Measurement:* To ensure accountability of police to the local community for meeting their

designated functions and for improving policing effectiveness, police should carry out constant, ongoing assessment and measurement of (a) their relationship with citizens and other legitimate interests, (b) police outputs, and (c) outcomes. This approach is consistent with the concept of a balanced scorecard. Ideally, police should have this capacity in-house; however, obtaining assistance from outside agencies is a reasonable alternative.

- *Promoting Excellence in Policing Practices:* Police now have available a rapidly developing inventory of best practices that can be drawn upon to improve their skills and effectiveness and that also can be used as benchmarks for evaluating their current performance. They should be held accountable for knowing about, being able to assess the potential utility for their own use, and implementing recognized best practices in policing.
- *Management and Leadership Accountability:* Police leadership must ultimately be held accountable for the conduct of police performance, for the achievement of established goals and outcomes, and for instituting a measurement system that ensures police accountability to the local community. Police leaders and managers should evidence mastery and successful application of basic control principles.
- *Alternative Policing:* Public police, policymakers, and political leaders should look to civilianization,

outsourcing, privatization, managed competition, and regionalization to maximize use of available resources and to improve policing services, with appropriate caveats.

In light of the storm brewing south of the border, we strongly recommend that communities in Arizona take immediate steps to institutionalize these fundamental principles of high-performance policing through the enactment of appropriate statutes, ordinances, and management directives. The steps will help ensure that Arizona's police departments remain true to their primary functions of protecting citizens' rights and maintaining law and order.

In light of the storm brewing south of the border, we strongly recommend that communities in Arizona take immediate steps to institutionalize these fundamental principles of high-performance policing through the enactment of appropriate statutes, ordinances, and management directives. The steps will help ensure that Arizona's police departments remain true to their primary functions of protecting citizens' rights and maintaining law and order.

About the Authors

George L. Kelling holds a doctorate in social welfare from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Kelling is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute and recently retired as a professor in the School of Criminal Justice at Rutgers University. Formerly, he was a professor in criminal justice at Northeastern University and a fellow in the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He has practiced social work as a child-care worker and as a probation officer, and he has administered residential care programs for aggressive and disturbed youths. In 1972, Kelling began work at the Police Foundation and conducted several large-scale experiments, most notably the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment and the Newark Foot Patrol Experiment. The latter was the source of his contribution to his most familiar publication in *The Atlantic*, “Broken Windows,” with James Q. Wilson.

During the late 1980s, Kelling developed policies to maintain order in the New York City subway system that ultimately led to radical crime reductions. Later, he consulted with the New York City and Los Angeles police departments under William Bratton.

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NOTES

1. Nick Dranias, "A New Charter for American Cities: 10 Rights to Restrain Government and Protect Freedom," Goldwater Institute Policy Report, March 11, 2009, 40-41, available at <http://goldwaterinstitute.org/article/2745> (last visited September 13, 2010).

2. Evan Perez, "Violent Crime Falls Sharply," *Wall Street Journal*, May 25, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB10001424052748704113504575264432463469618.html (last visited September 13, 2010).

3. Dennis Wagner, "Rocky Point Police Chief Shot," *Arizona Republic*, June 22, 2010, available at <http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2010/06/22/20100622rockypoint0622.html> (last visited September 13, 2010).

4. Jerry Seper and Matthew Cella, "Signs in Arizona Warn of Smuggler Dangers," *Washington Times*, August 31, 2010, available at <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/aug/31/signs-in-arizona-warn-of-smuggler-dangers/> (last visited September 13, 2010); Terence P. Jeffrey, "Arizona Sheriff: Border Patrol Has Retreated from Parts of Border Because It's 'Too Dangerous,'" *CNSNEWS.com*, August 16, 2010, available at <http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/71105> (last visited September 13, 2010).

5. Erin Kelly, "As Border Patrol Expands, Corruption Concerns Rise," *Arizona Republic*, March 10, 2010, available at <http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2010/03/12/20100312border-corruption-on-the-rise.html> (last visited September 13, 2010); Dennis Wagner, "Major Arizona Drug-smuggling Ring Broken Up," *Arizona Republic*, April 27, 2010, available at <http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2010/04/27/20100427arizona-drug-ring->

broken-up.html (last visited September 13, 2010); Andrew Becker, "Southwest Border Corruption Cases Continue to Rise," Center for Investigative Reporting (blog), November 20, 2009, available at <http://www.centerforinvestigativereporting.org/blogpost/20091120southwestbordercorruptioncasescontinuetorise> (last visited September 13, 2010); Ralph Vartabedian, "U.S. Soldiers, Law Officers Snared in Border Drug Sting," *Los Angeles Times*, May 13, 2005, available at <http://articles.latimes.com/2005/may/13/nation/nabribes13> (last visited September 13, 2010).

6. Peel's Principles cited in Louis A. Radelet and David L. Carter, *The Police and the Community*, 5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1944), 9, quoting W.L. Melville Lee, *A History of Police in England* (London: Methuen, 1901), chap. 12.

7. One final introductory note is in order: included in the analysis and discussion that follow are brief references regarding the applicability to various police departments in Maricopa County (including Phoenix) and also to Tucson. Because we did not have the opportunity to visit Arizona police departments, all citations to policing there are based upon data available from previously conducted studies and departmental websites. Other researchers no doubt will, and readers themselves should, exercise appropriate caution in making judgments about current police operations based upon these data. Websites consulted included Chandler Police Department (<http://chandlerpd.com/>), Mesa Police Department (<http://www.mesaaz.gov/police/>), Tempe Police Department (<http://www.tempe.gov/police/>), Phoenix Police Department (<http://phoenix.gov/police/index.html>), and Tucson Police Department (<http://tpdinternet.tucsonaz.gov/>).

8. George L. Kelling and Mark H. Moore, "The Evolving Strategy of Policing," *Perspectives on Policing* (National Institute of Justice) 4 (November 1988). Some have argued, especially advocates of "evidence-based," "intelligence-led," or "predictive" policing, that we are now at the end of the community era and entering a new policing paradigm. We believe this to be mistaken, since all such empirical approaches simply add new analytical techniques to the problem-solving methods that are integral ingredients of community policing.
9. Robert M. Fogelson, *Big-City Police* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), 13-14.
10. August Vollmer, "Police Progress in the Past Twenty-Five Years," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* 24, no. 1 (May-June 1933).
11. O. W. Wilson, "Basic Police Policies," *The Police Chief* (International Association of Chiefs of Police) (November 1956): 28-29.
12. See Mark Moore, with David Thacher, Andrea Dodge, and Tobias Moore, *Recognizing Value in Policing* (Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum, 2002) and NetMBA, "Process Flow Structures" at <http://netmba.com/operations/process/structure/> (last visited September 13, 2010).
13. For a summary of this research, see George L. Kelling and Catherine M. Coles, "The Failure of Past Policing Strategies," in *Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order & Reducing Crime in Our Communities* (New York: Free Press, 1996), 70-107.
14. Alan M. Weber, "Crime and Management: An Interview with New York City Police Commissioner Lee P. Brown," *Harvard Business Review* (May-June 1991): 112.
15. Norman Podhoretz, "My New York," *National Review* (June 4, 1999): 2-8.
16. George Kelling, "Measuring What Matters," *City Journal* (Spring 1992): 21-33.
17. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, and Princeton University Study Group on Criminal Justice Performance Measures, *Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System* (Washington, D.C., 1993).
18. James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, "Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety," *The Atlantic* (March 1982): 29-38.
19. Herman Goldstein, *Problem-Oriented Policing* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990).
20. See generally Gary Cordner, *Reducing Fear of Crime: Strategies for Police* (U.S. Department of Justice, January 2010), 20-21, available at <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/RIC/Publications/e110913242-ReducingFear.pdf> (last visited September 2, 2010).
21. George L. Kelling and William H. Sousa, Jr., "Do Police Matter: An Analysis of the Impact of New York City's Police Reform," Manhattan Institute Civic Report no. 22 (December 2001).
22. For a detailed account, see Kelling and Coles, "Chapter Four, Taking Back the Subway: New York City's Quality-of-Life Program," in *Fixing Broken Windows*, 108-156.
23. William Bratton, *Turnaround: How America's Top Cop Reversed the Crime Epidemic* (New York: Random House, 1998), 294.
24. For a full description of the CompStat process and implementation, see Jon Shane, "CompStat Process," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* (April 2004): 12-21; "CompStat Design," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* (May 2004): 12-19; and "CompStat Implementation," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* (June 2004): 13-21. For a description of a CompStat-like process in the private sector, see Robert Simons, "Control in an

Age of Empowerment,” *Harvard Business Review* (March-April 1995): 80-88.

25. David Kennedy, “Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings, and a Theory Prevention,” *Valparaiso University Law Review* 31 (1997): 449-484.

26. Shane, “CompStat Implementation,” 20.

27. Figures are based upon the 2000 census and 2007 projections; available June 27, 2010, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_US_states_by_population_density.

28. Data are for 2007-2008, from Kaiser State Health Facts, available August 27, 2010, at <http://www.statehealthfactsonline.org/comparebar.jsp?ind=18&cat=1>.

29. Data are for 2007-2008, from Kaiser State Health Facts, available June 27, 2010, at <http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparebar.jsp?ind=2&cat=1>.

30. For a discussion of Tempe’s response to gangs earlier in the decade, see Institute for Law and Justice, *Evaluation of Community Policing in Tempe, Arizona: Final Report* (National Institute of Justice, Department of Justice, March 2002). On Phoenix, see Charles M. Katz and Vincent J. Webb, “Police Response to Gangs,” Institute for Law and Justice, April 2004.

31. See Mesa Police Department’s website at <http://www.mesaaz.gov/police/COMPSTAT/statistics.aspx>.

32. Institute for Law and Justice, *Evaluation of Community Policing in Tempe, Arizona*.

33. Vincent Webb, Scott Decker, and Shawn Ward, *Police Department Systems Technology Enhancement Project (ISTEP): Case Study, Tempe, Arizona* (Cambridge, Mass.: Abt Associates, April 1999).

34. The balanced scorecard, along with benchmarks, has been used as a template for improving and measuring performance throughout organizations. See Robert S.

Kaplan and David P. Norton, “Using the Balanced Scorecard as a Strategic Management System,” *Harvard Business Review* (July-August 2007), and “Balanced Scorecard Hall of Fame Profile: Royal Canadian Mounted Police,” Harvard Business School and Balanced Scorecard Collaborative (2005).

35. Moore et al., *Recognizing Value in Policing*, 61-65.

36. The framework builds upon the work of Professor Mark Moore of Harvard University and his colleagues, who identify seven ultimate objectives of police performance, and suggest seven related outcomes with corresponding measures. Moore et al., *Recognizing Value in Policing*; Mark H. Moore, with Anthony Braga, *The “Bottom Line” of Policing: What Citizens Should Value (and Measure!) in Police Performance* (Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum, 2003).

37. For police, these groups include, among others, local elected officials (mayors, city council members, police commissions, civilian review boards, and specially commissioned boards), state officials and agencies, federal agencies, the media, interest groups (e.g., police unions or the American Civil Liberties Union), criminal justice partner agencies (district attorneys, city attorneys, federal attorneys, courts, probation, parole), private sector partners (BIDs, private security agencies, health organizations, business groups), and neighborhood associations, community leaders, and private citizens.

38. An array of functions was recognized explicitly in the set of standards for criminal justice published in February 1979 by the American Bar Association (ABA). Part of the ABA report identified the following functions of police: identify criminal offenders and criminal activity and, where appropriate, apprehend offenders and participate in subsequent court proceedings;

reduce opportunities for the commission of some crimes through preventive patrol and other measures; aid individuals who are in danger of physical harm; protect constitutional guarantees; facilitate the movement of people and vehicles; assist those who cannot care for themselves; resolve conflict; identify potentially serious law enforcement or governmental problems; create and maintain a feeling of security in the community; promote and preserve civil order; and provide other services on an emergency basis. In respects, publication of these functions gave strong voice to the shift in police strategy occurring at the time, though still in inchoate form. *ABA Standards for Criminal Justice I*, 2nd ed. (American Bar Association, 1980).

39. Although beyond the scope of this report, looming in the background of any current discussion of policing in Arizona is the issue of illegal immigration and the role of local police in dealing with it. Most police leaders are reluctant to have local police take a lead role in identifying and arresting illegal immigrants. Their reasons are not ideological, since they have no qualms about contacting federal officials when illegal immigrants commit crimes. Their concerns are multiple: first, whether appropriate or not, many police departments got burned badly by “racial profiling,” and few departments want to go through this again. Second, leaders are concerned that victims and witnesses of crimes who are illegal immigrants will not be willing to come forward to report their experiences, in effect making them fair game for criminal predators. Finally, local police have worked hard to establish appropriate relations with minority and immigrant neighborhoods and fear losing those relationships. To be sure, this does not mean that police should cater to illegal behavior or refuse to enforce a state law. But it does raise the question

of whether local police should absorb this federal responsibility at the cost of strained community relations.

40. See below, “Satisfying Customer Demand/Achieving Legitimacy with Those Policed,” items 7a-e.

41. The term “dimensions of police performance” and the general principles discussed in this paragraph are attributable to the work and research of Moore et al., *Recognizing Value in Policing*, and Moore and Braga, *The “Bottom Line” of Policing*.

42. Moore uses the term “call offenders to account”; however, this phrase is misleading. Taken literally, it implies that police move beyond investigation and arrest to achieving justice on their own. Clearly this is not what Moore and his colleagues intend. We think this aspect of police actions actually refers to initiating the full process of holding offenders accountable through their actions. Consequently through the rest of this monograph we substitute the phrase “effectively initiate justice processes” for “calling offenders to account.”

43. Moore et al., *Recognizing Value in Policing*, 78.

44. The balanced scorecard, along with benchmarks, has been used as a template for improving and measuring performance throughout organizations. See Kaplan and Norton, “Using the Balanced Scorecard as a Strategic Management System”; “Balanced Scorecard Hall of Fame Profile: Royal Canadian Mounted Police”; and Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, *The Balanced Scorecard: Translating Strategy into Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 1996).

45. “Benchmark,” *Oxford Dictionary of Business* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), <http://www.oxfordreference.com>.

46. Robert S. Kaplan, “The Limits of Benchmarking,” *Balanced Scorecard Report*

(Harvard Business School Publishing, 2005), 3.

47. Lawrence W. Sherman and Richard A. Berk, *The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment* (Police Foundation, April 1984).

48. This does not mean that police departments should not attempt to search for best practices and use benchmarking to evaluate themselves, their units, or their personnel. It might mean that departments must take one step backward when drawing comparisons. By this we mean that benchmarking, at least in some of its initial uses, might need to focus less on outcomes and outputs (tactics) and more on the processes that gave rise to the tactics. Did the department, unit, or officer approach the presenting problem in a systematic way that has given rise to successful tactics or outcomes for dealing with similar problems in other cities, departments, or units? The “reference point” in such an approach is neither the outcome nor output; it is the process, whether CompStat or another form of problem-solving, through which outputs or tactics are developed. Finally, a benchmark could be used as a starting point for a unit or department seeking to compare problem trends over time. Some of the same data and definitional problems might be present, but they are more easily managed in such a scenario.

49. Police Foundation, *The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment* (Washington, D.C., 1981).

50. For example, the Resource Information Center of the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) has a lengthy online list of best practice brochures that range from “Abandoned Vehicles” to “Witness Intimidation.” The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) has a similar inventory of best practices that cover management as

well as community problem issues.

51. An important caveat: even though regular foot patrol might be conducted in a particular neighborhood, the use of foot patrol does not in itself indicate that the department is conducting community policing. Similarly, a department might create neighborhood storefront offices, but this does not mean that the department is actually carrying out community policing. No particular *program* or *tactic* alone constitutes real community policing; rather, community policing is a department-wide strategy that operates through a geographical focus, utilizes a problem-oriented approach, and seeks to involve local capacities in determining priorities and specific problem-solving methods. Kelling and Moore, “The Evolving Strategy of Policing.”

52. See David Kennedy, “Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings, and a Theory Prevention,” *Valparaiso University Law Review* 31 (1997): 449-484.

53. Kelling and Coles, *Fixing Broken Windows*, ch. 4:108-156; ch. 6:194-235.

54. We thank Robert Wasserman, a police consultant, for his advice on this section.

55. Dranias, “A New Charter for American Cities,” 40-41.

56. For a detailed account of the history of private approaches to public safety and the issues associated with privatization and civilianization, see Brian Forst, “The Privatization and Civilianization of Policing,” in *Boundary Changes in Criminal Justice Organizations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 2000), http://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal_justice2000/vol2_2000.html (last visited September 13, 2010).

57. Personal experience of George Kelling regarding the Milwaukee Police Department during the 1960s.

58. See Alexis Sotiropoulos, “Making Time: Freeing Up Front-Line Policing,” Serco Institute (London, 2008).

59. Peter Greenwood, Jan Chaiken, and Joan Petersilia, *The Criminal Investigation Process* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1977).

60. See Clifford Shearing, “The Relationship between Public and Private Policing,” in Michael Tonry and Norval Morris, *Modern Policing* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

61. Kelling and Coles, *Fixing Broken Windows*, 111-114.

62. During the early 2000s, Kelling was asked by Los Angeles Chief of Police William Bratton to help reclaim the city’s MacArthur Park. In this case, the LAPD mobilized segments of the community, ranging from local citizen groups to the Parks Department and put together a plan modeled on that created for Bryant Park in New York City to reclaim the park. It too has been a great success. The captain who successfully headed this effort was rewarded by a series of quick promotions—Charlie Beck is now chief of the LAPD.

63. See Robin A. Johnson and Norman Walzer, “Privatization and Managed Competition: Management Fad or Long-Term Systematic Change for Cities,” ch. 9 in *Local Government Innovation: Issues and Trends in Privatization and Managed Competition* (Westport, Conn.: Quorum Books, 2000).

64. Kelling and Coles, *Fixing Broken Windows*, 194-235.

65. Stephen Goldsmith, personal interview with George Kelling, June 11, 2010.

66. For details about outsource contracting, see Gary L. Sturgess, “To Gladden the Heart of Miss Nightingale: Contracting for Complexity,” Serco Institute Discussion Paper no. 2 (London, 2006),

and Briony Smith, “What Gets Measured: Contracting for Delivery,” Serco Institute (London, 2007).

67. Personal observations, George Kelling, 2000-2005.

68. For a detailed discussion of fusion centers see “Fusion Center Guidelines,” Executive Summary (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, April 2006), available at http://www.iir.com/global/products/fusion_center_executive_summary.pdf (last visited September 13, 2010).

69. Many substantive questions are present and must be addressed wherever the options of using private or public police (other than local public police) are considered: How do we ensure equitable policing? How would further privatization affect information sharing—a critical issue given terrorism? To what extent should or could we privatize the use of force or authorize its use by agencies not directly accountable to local citizens or authorities? Finally, how would a focus on policing activities in geographical areas, and on police relationships with and accountability to these neighborhoods, be maintained? While we cannot address here all these (or other) concerns implicated in using managed competition and/or private policing, they present basic issues related to organizational accountability.

70. Hon. William H. Erickson, Chairman, *The Report of Governor Bill Owen’s Columbine Review Commission*, ix (State of Colorado, May 2001), available at http://www.state.co.us/columbine/Columbine_20Report_WEB.pdf (last visited September 13, 2010).

71. See Christopher Stone, Todd Foglesong, and Christine M. Cole, “Policing Los Angeles Under a Consent Decree: The

Dynamics of Change at the LAPD,” Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, Working Paper Series, Harvard Kennedy School (May 2009); Anthony A. Braga and Christopher Winship, “Partnership, Accountability, and Innovation: Clarifying Boston’s Experience with Pulling Levers,” in *Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives*, ed. David Weisburd and Anthony A. Braga (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 171-187.

72. Tempe Police Department Strategic Plan (2009-2010 to 2011-2012), available at <http://www.tempe.gov/cau/StrategicPlan.pdf> (last visited September 13, 2010); Chandler Police Department Strategic Plan (2008-09), available at http://www.chandlerpd.com/pdfs/2007_08_Strategic_Plan.pdf (last visited September 13, 2010).

73. Recently, for example, a dispute arose when a researcher charged that NYPD precinct commanders altered UCR data to get positive results. Several observers were quick to point out that victimization data correlated highly with the UCR data in critical dimensions, thus cross-verifying the findings.

74. To restate, we use Moore’s seven dimensions of the police performance and some of his elaborations on them. As readers will note, we have added materials to his original conceptualizations.

75. The claim has been made that Maricopa County has misreported crime clearances. See Clint Bolick, “Justice Denied: The Improper Clearance of Unsolved Crimes by the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office,” Goldwater Institute Policy Brief no. 09-03 (May 21, 2009), available at <http://goldwaterinstitute.org/article/2785> (last visited September 13, 2010).

76. Mark H. Moore and Anthony A. Braga, “Measuring and Improving Police Performance: The Lessons of CompStat

and Its Progeny,” *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management* 26, no. 3 (2003): 439-453, available at <http://www.emeraldinsight.com/1363-951X.htm> (last visited September 13, 2010).

77. Moore and Braga, “Measuring and Improving Police Performance.”

78. See for example, Beth A. Sanders and Marc L. Fields, “Partnerships with University-based Researchers,” *The Police Chief* (June 2009), available at http://policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=1821&issue_id=62009. One of the best known partnerships over time has taken place with the Chicago CAPS program. See Wesley Skogan and Lynn Steiner, *Community Policing in Chicago, Year Ten: an Evaluation of Chicago’s Alternative Policing Strategy*, Chicago Community Policing Evaluation Consortium and Institute for Policy Research, Northwestern University (January 2004), available at http://www.northwestern.edu/ipr/publications/policing_papers/Yr10-CAPSeval.pdf; and Wesley G. Skogan, *Police and Community in Chicago: A Tale of Three Cities* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

79. See W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, “Tipping Point Leadership,” *Harvard Business Review* (April 2003): 2-12; see also Robert Simons, “Control in an Age of Empowerment,” *Harvard Business Review* (March-April 1995): 80-88, especially numbers 5 and 6.

80. See, Brenda E. Joyner and Cecily A. Raiborn, “Management Caveats for Measuring and Assessing Public Responsibility Performance,” *Business Horizons* 48 (2005): 525-533.

81. Both the terms “boundaries” and “interactive control mechanisms” are derived from the work of Robert Simons. See Simons, *Control in an Age*.

82. Dranias, *A New Charter for American Cities*, 41.

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